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Comment 
INTERPRETING EMOLUMENTS TODAY:  
THE FRAMERS’ INTENT AND THE “PRESENT” PROBLEM 
BIANCA SPINOSA∗ 
“The $200 million hotel inside the federally owned Old Post Of-
fice building has become the place to see, be seen, drink, net-
work—even live—for the still-emerging Trump set.  It’s a rich en-
vironment for lobbyists and anyone hoping to rub elbows with 
Trump-related politicos . . . .”1 
 
Two provisions of the United States Constitution, the Foreign and 
Domestic Emoluments Clauses (“the Clauses”) historically received very 
little attention, but for the first time, they are being interpreted in federal 
court.  Three separate lawsuits allege President Donald Trump’s business 
interests are violating these Clauses.2  These business interests stem from 
President Trump’s role as a well-known global businessperson and founder 
of the Trump Organization before becoming President.3  The Trump Organ-
ization has ten hotels in its real estate portfolio.4  One of these hotels, the 
Trump International Hotel (“Trump Hotel”), is located in the Old Post Of-
fice Building within a mile of the White House.5  The Old Post Office 
Building has been on the National Register of Historic Places since 19736 
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 1.  Julie Bykowicz, Donald Trump’s Hotel May Be Political Capital of the Nation’s Capital, 
BOS. GLOBE (Mar. 5, 2017), https://www.bostonglobe.com/news/nation/2017/03/05/donald-
trump-hotel-may-political-capital-nation-capital/4qXAB8GFkMRkl0w9aIYRcL/story.html. 
 2.  See infra Section I.D. 
 3.  See Donald J. Trump: Founder, The Trump Organization, TRUMP ORG., 
https://www.trump.com/leadership/donald-j-trump-biography (last visited Apr. 17, 2019). 
 4. The Trump Story, TRUMP ORG., https://www.trump.com/hotels (last visited Apr. 17, 
2019).  
 5.  Bykowicz, supra note 1. 
 6.  Old Post Office, Washington, D.C., GSA, https://www.gsa.gov/historic-buildings/old-
post-office-washington-dc (last visited Apr. 17, 2019).  The Old Post Office Building was built 
from 1892 to 1899 and originally housed the headquarters of the U.S. Post Office Department.  Id. 
 2019] INTERPRETING EMOLUMENTS TODAY 999 
and, like other historic properties the General Services Administration 
(“GSA”) maintains, can be rented.7  In 2013, the GSA leased the Old Post 
Office Building to Mr. Trump.8   
In January 2017, President-Elect Trump’s personal attorneys an-
nounced Mr. Trump would turn over management of the Trump Organiza-
tion’s “investment and business assets” to a trust in order to avoid conflicts 
of interest.9  According to a Morgan Lewis White Paper, President-Elect 
Trump planned to put all his Trump Organization investment and business 
assets into a trust his sons, Donald J. Trump, Jr. and Eric Trump, would 
manage.10  After the inauguration, President Trump’s lawyers informed the 
GSA he had placed his interest in the Old Post Office Building into a trust 
and was not managing that interest any longer.11  In March 2017, the GSA 
determined President Trump was complying with the lease of the Old Post 
Office Building.12  According to an Office of Inspector General report on 
the GSA, however, the agency did not give enough attention to constitu-
tional issues raised about whether President Trump’s interests in the Old 
Post Office Building ran afoul of the Emoluments Clauses.13  
Mr. Trump amassed a larger-than-life business and reputation before 
he became President, but does his interest in the Trump Hotel through the 
Donald J. Trump Revocable Trust (“the Trust”)14 amount to violations of 
the Foreign and Domestic Emoluments Clauses?  The press have widely re-
ported that foreign government officials stay at the luxury Hotel while in 
                                                          
The building is situated on a city block in the “Federal Triangle” area of the city along Pennsylva-
nia Avenue.  Id.  
 7.  Renting GSA Property, GSA, https://www.gsa.gov/real-estate/gsa-properties/renting-gsa-
property (last visited Apr. 19, 2019).  
 8.  See Jessica Taylor & Peter Overby, Federal Watchdog Finds Government Ignored Emol-
uments Clause with Trump Hotel, NPR (Jan. 16, 2019), 
https://www.npr.org/2019/01/16/685977471/federal-watchdog-finds-government-ignored-
emoluments-clause-with-trump-hotel; OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. GEN. SERVS. ADMIN., 
EVALUATION OF GSA’S MANAGEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF THE OLD POST OFFICE 
BUILDING LEASE 2 (2019), https://www.gsaig.gov/sites/default/files/ipa-reports/JE19-
002%20OIG%20EVALUATION%20REPORT-
GSA%27s%20Management%20%26%20Administration%20of%20OPO%20Building%20Lease_
January%2016%202019_Redacted.pdf.  “Donald J. Trump” and the “Trump Old Post Office 
Member Corp.,” a Delaware corporation Trump wholly owned, was the tenant.  Id.  
 9.  MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP, CONFLICTS OF INTEREST AND THE PRESIDENT 1, 2 
(2017), https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/3400512/Morgan-Lewis-Trump-Trust-White-
Paper.pdf [hereinafter MORGAN LEWIS WHITE PAPER].  
 10.  Id. at 2.  
 11.  OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 8, at 8. 
 12.  Id. at 10. 
 13.  Id. at 5.   
 14.  MORGAN LEWIS WHITE PAPER, supra note 9, at 2; Answer of the President in His Offi-
cial Capacity at 8, District of Columbia v. Trump, 291 F. Supp. 3d 725 (D. Md. 2018), 315 F. 
Supp. 3d 875 (D. Md. 2018) (No. 8:17-cv-1596-PJM). 
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Washington, D.C.15  The Attorneys General in Maryland and Washington, 
D.C. filed a lawsuit against President Trump, in his official capacity, alleg-
ing violations of the Foreign and Domestic Emoluments Clause.16  Accord-
ing to the lawsuit, foreign government officials said they chose to stay at 
the Trump Hotel because it is associated with the President.17  Maryland 
and Washington, D.C. Attorneys General provided a laundry list of the al-
leged violations involving the Trump Hotel in their Amended Complaint in 
District of Columbia v. Trump,18 including an event the Embassy of Kuwait 
hosted, a “National Day celebration,” at the Trump Hotel on February 22, 
2017.19  The Embassy of Kuwait allegedly paid from $40,000 to $60,000 in 
connection with the celebration at the Trump Hotel.20   
While President Trump officially transferred management interests of 
the Trump Organization to the Trust in January 2017,21 the President re-
mained informed about at least some of the Trump Organization’s business 
activities through the Trust.22  Before taking office, Mr. Trump stated the 
Trump Organization would donate all profits earned from foreign govern-
ments to the U.S. Treasury Department.23  On February 25, 2019, the 
Trump Organization announced it had donated nearly $200,000 to the U.S. 
Treasury in order not to retain profits from foreign governments using its 
properties.24  In addition, the Trump Organization agreed not to make any 
                                                          
 15.  District of Columbia v. Trump, 291 F. Supp. 3d 725, 734 (D. Md. 2018) (citing Amended 
Complaint at 14–16, Trump, 291 F. Supp. 3d 725 (No. 8:17-cv-1596-PJM)); Bykowicz, supra 
note 1; Julia Harte, Kuwait Could Pay up to $60,000 for Party at Trump Hotel in Washington, 
REUTERS (Feb. 25, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-hotel-idUSKBN1640LE; 
Jackie Northam, Kuwait Celebration at Trump Hotel Raises Conflict of Interest Questions, NPR 
(Feb. 25, 2017), https://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2017/02/25/517039323/kuwait-celebration-
at-trump-hotel-raises-conflict-of-interest-questions.  
 16.  Amended Complaint at 2, Trump, 291 F. Supp. 3d 725 (No. 8:17-cv-1596-PJM).  
 17.  Trump, 291 F. Supp. 3d at 734 (citing Amended Complaint, supra note 16).  
 18.  291 F. Supp. 3d 725 (D. Md. 2018).  
 19.  Amended Complaint, supra note 16, at 15. 
 20.  Id.  
 21.  See supra notes 10–11 and accompanying text.  
 22.  See Trump, 291 F. Supp. 3d at 733–34; Answer of the President, supra note 14, at 17.  
According to the Answer, President Trump receives information about the Trust’s assets limited to 
“total profit or loss.”  Answer of the President, supra note 14, at 17.  The Trust “directly or indi-
rectly owns all of the President’s investment and business assets,” the trustees control the trust 
assets and distribution, and “the President is the beneficiary of the Trust.”  Id. at 16.  
 23.  Trump, 291 F. Supp. 3d at 733.  
 24.  Bernard Condon, Trump Org Donates Nearly $200K to Cover Foreign Profits, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Feb. 25, 2019), 
https://www.apnews.com/a4349ac80a7048bdb61f017fffd9623f.  “The Trump Organization said a 
check for $191,538 sent to Treasury represents profits from embassy parties, hotel stays and other 
foreign government spending at its Washington Hotel and other properties . . . .”  Id.   
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foreign business deals while he was in office.25  But are these efforts 
enough?  
Ethics experts from both President Barack Obama’s and President 
George W. Bush’s administrations have called on the President to do more 
than put his business interests and assets in a trust his sons control.26  Ac-
cording to Norman L. Eisen, the chair of the government watchdog group 
Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington (“CREW”)27 and the 
White House Special Counsel for Ethics and Government Reform under 
President Obama; Richard W. Painter, the Associate Counsel to President 
G.W. Bush and chief ethics lawyer; and Laurence H. Tribe, a Constitutional 
Law professor at Harvard University, “Never in American history has a 
president . . . presented more conflict of interest questions and foreign en-
tanglements than Donald Trump.”28 
President Trump’s business practices and the Trust formation drew at-
tention to the Emoluments Clauses and led to ongoing litigation regarding 
potential violations of those Clauses.29  This Comment will contribute to the 
ongoing conversation regarding the meaning and reach of the Emoluments 
Clauses30 by asking the question: What theory or theories of constitutional 
interpretation should courts use to interpret the meaning of the Foreign and 
Domestic Emoluments Clauses?  Rather than take a position on whether 
President Trump is violating the Emoluments Clauses, this Comment will 
analyze the courts’ reasoning and explore how different theories of constitu-
tional interpretation have and could apply to the Emoluments Clause provi-
sions of the Constitution.  This Comment will analyze how courts in the 
emoluments litigation adopted an originalist and purposive approach to in-
terpreting the provisions, focusing on what the Emoluments Clauses meant 
at the time of the Founding.31 
                                                          
 25.  Id.; see MORGAN LEWIS WHITE PAPER, supra note 9, at 2, 3 (describing how the Trump 
Organization would not be making any new deals, the Trust Agreement does not allow any new 
foreign deals while Mr. Trump is President, and the Trust and the Trump Organization will not 
“engag[e] in any new deals with respect to the use of the ‘Trump’ brand . . . associated with the 
Trump Organization or Donald J. Trump in any foreign jurisdictions”).  
 26.  NORMAN L. EISEN ET AL., BROOKINGS INST., THE EMOLUMENTS CLAUSE: ITS TEXT, 
MEANING, AND APPLICATION TO DONALD J. TRUMP 1 (2016), 
https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-emoluments-clause-its-text-meaning-and-application-to-
donald-j-trump/.  See supra notes 9–10 and accompanying text.  
 27. Eisen’s watchdog group, CREW, is a plaintiff in the Emoluments Clause case in New 
York.  Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Wash. v. Trump, 276 F. Supp. 3d 174, 180 
(S.D.N.Y. 2017).  
 28.  EISEN ET AL., supra note 26, at 1.  
 29.  See infra Section I.D.  
 30.  See Zephyr Teachout, Gifts, Offices, and Corruption, 107 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 30, 
34 (2012) (arguing that when the Framers included the Foreign Emoluments Clause in the Consti-
tution they were distancing themselves from European diplomatic culture to avoid corruption); see 
also infra note 49 and accompanying text.  
 31.  See infra Sections II.A.1, II.A.4.  
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This Comment will also argue that courts can reach the same result of 
finding that the plaintiffs have plausibly stated a claim of an Emoluments 
Clause violation by applying the Clauses’ anti-corruption purpose32 to the 
world we live in today through a living approach to constitutional interpre-
tation.33  While many of the Justices on the Supreme Court are originalists, 
the National Law Journal reported Justice Kagan said some Justices think 
“‘original understanding’ is the ‘alpha and omega of every constitutional 
question,’ . . . but ‘there are other people on this bench who do not.’”34  Fi-
nally, this Comment will analyze how an abstract, anti-corruption principle 
embedded in the Clauses can result in a living, moral reading of the provi-
sions.35  This Comment will show how courts need not be confined to one 
theory of constitutional interpretation to reach the same conclusion that the 
Emoluments Clauses are provisions that guard against corruption and undue 
foreign influence.  In support of this argument, this Comment will examine 
the text of the Constitution’s Foreign and Domestic Emoluments Clauses, 
the history and purpose of the Clauses, early cases involving emoluments, 
executive branch precedent, and the recent litigation.36 
I.  BACKGROUND 
Until President Trump, no President or other high-level U.S. official 
had faced a violation of the Foreign or Domestic Emoluments Clauses.37  
Meaning, no federal judge has needed to interpret the meaning of the word 
emoluments, which is undefined in the Clauses.38  Professor John Mikhail 
of the Georgetown University Law Center said, “[I]t comes as a surprise to 
many people that there are terms in the Constitution . . . that . . . have never 
                                                          
 32.  See Blumenthal v. Trump, 335 F. Supp. 3d 45, 53 (D.D.C. 2018) (“The Clause was in-
tended by the Framers to guard against corruption and foreign influence.”); District of Columbia 
v. Trump, 315. F. Supp. 3d 875, 896 (D. Md. 2018) (finding the historical record reflects an “in-
tention that the Emoluments Clauses function as broad anti-corruption provisions.”); Citizens for 
Responsibility & Ethics in Wash., 276 F. Supp. 3d at 188 (finding that based on the history, “there 
can be no doubt” the Foreign Emoluments Clause’s purpose “was to prevent official corruption 
and foreign influence”); see also EISEN ET AL., supra note 26; Deborah Samuel Sills, The Foreign 
Emoluments Clause: Protecting Our National Security Interests, 26 J.L. & POL’Y 63, 73 (2018); 
Zephyr Teachout, The Anti-Corruption Principle, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 341, 353 (2009); infra 
Section II.A. 
 33.  See infra Section II.B. 
 34.  Marcia Coyle, Justice Kagan Throws Shade on Her Originalist Colleagues, NAT’L L.J. 
(Dec. 6, 2018), https://www.law.com/nationallawjournal/2018/12/06/justice-kagan-throws-shade-
on-her-originalist-colleagues/?slreturn=20181126140203.  
 35.  See infra Section II.C. 
 36.  See infra Section I.A–D. 
 37.  Peter Overby, Federal Lawsuit Against President Trump’s Business Interests Allowed to 
Proceed, NPR (July 25, 2018), https://www.npr.org/2018/07/25/632300960/federal-lawsuit-
against-president-trumps-business-interests-allowed-to-proceed. 
 38.  Id. 
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been authoritatively adjudicated.”39  In the absence of a body of constitu-
tional law on the Clauses, courts have looked to the text of the Constitution 
and Founding-era dictionaries to ascertain the meaning of the word emolu-
ments.40   
The plain language of the Foreign Emoluments Clause is found in Ar-
ticle I, Section 9, Clause 8 of the Constitution.  It provides:  
No Title of Nobility shall be granted by the United States: And no 
Person holding any Office of Profit or Trust under them, shall, 
without the Consent of the Congress, accept of any present, 
Emolument, Office, or Title, of any kind whatever, from any 
King, Prince, or foreign State.41   
The plain language of the Domestic Emoluments Clause, found in Article 
II, Section 1, Clause 7, provides:  
The President shall, at stated Times, receive for his Services, a 
Compensation, which shall neither be encreased nor diminished 
during the Period for which he shall have been elected, and he 
shall not receive within that Period any other Emolument from 
the United States, or any of them.42   
While the meaning of some words in the Clauses such as, present, Office, 
Title, and Compensation are fairly straightforward, the meaning of the word 
emoluments is less clear.43 
Section I.A will evaluate the plain language and purpose of the For-
eign and Domestic Emoluments Clauses and review the history of their in-
clusion in the Constitution.44  Because emoluments is an archaic word, the 
word’s meaning is open to interpretation and at the heart of the disputes.  
The plaintiffs in the recent emoluments litigation argue emoluments has a 
broad meaning encompassing any profit, gain, or advantage.45  President 
Trump argues emolument has a narrow, office-related definition—
something that is accepted in exchange for performing a service or favor.46  
Section I.B will discuss early cases involving emoluments, and Section I.C. 
will analyze executive branch precedent wherein the Office of Legal Coun-
sel (“OLC”) has construed the Clauses broadly as anti-corruption provi-
sions.47  Section I.D. will describe the three pieces of litigation involving 
                                                          
 39.  Id.  
 40.  See infra Section I.D. 
 41.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8.  
 42.  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 7.  
 43.  District of Columbia v. Trump, 315 F. Supp. 3d 875, 886 (D. Md. 2018) (interpreting the 
definition of an emolument after both parties offered different textual interpretations of the word).  
 44.  See infra Section I.A. 
 45.  See infra note 214–216 and accompanying text.  
 46.  See infra notes 218–221 and accompanying text.   
 47.  See infra Sections I.B, I.C.  
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the Foreign and Domestic Emoluments Clauses working their way through 
federal courts, and the different outcomes of the cases.48 
A.  Gold Snuff Boxes and Diamond-Encrusted Portraits: The Text and 
Historical Context of the Emoluments Clauses 
Many scholars agree that historical evidence at the time of the Found-
ing indicates, at least to some degree, the motivation for adding the Foreign 
Emoluments Clause to the Constitution was to avoid corrupting influ-
ences.49  Even before the separate states unified under the U.S. Constitution, 
a clause in Article VI of the Articles of Confederation of 1781 contained 
language about restrictions on U.S. officers accepting a present, gift, or 
emolument from a foreign entity: 
No state without the Consent of the united states, in congress as-
sembled, shall send any embassy to, or receive any embassy 
from, or enter into any conference, agreement, alliance or treaty 
with any King, prince or state; nor shall any person holding any 
office of profit or trust under the united states, or any of them, ac-
cept of any present, emolument, office or title of any kind what-
ever from any king, prince or foreign state; nor shall the united 
states in congress assembled, or any of them, grant any title of 
nobility.50 
During the Federal Convention of 1787, James Madison wrote that 
South Carolina Delegate Charles Pinckney “urged the necessity of preserv-
ing foreign Ministers [and] other officers of the U.S. independent of exter-
nal influence.”51  According to Madison, Delegate Pinckney suggested in-
serting a clause with the following language: “No person holding any office 
of profit or trust under the U.S. shall without the consent of the Legislature, 
accept of any present, emolument, office or title of any kind whatever, from 
                                                          
 48.  See infra Section I.D.  
 49.  See Teachout, supra note 30, at 30 (discussing how the Founders were wary of officers 
accepting gifts because they could “influence” the officer); see also Sills, supra note 32, at 74 (de-
scribing how the Framers did not want officials to “be persuaded, either consciously or subcon-
sciously, to alter their decisions to benefit foreign powers”); EISEN ET AL., supra note 26, at 4–5 
(describing how the Foreign Emoluments Clause was not meant to apply only to diplomats and 
was meant to be “a broader anti-corruption measure.”); Seth Barrett Tillman, The Original Public 
Meaning of the Foreign Emoluments Clause: A Reply to Professor Zephyr Teachout, 107 NW L. 
REV. COLLOQUY 180, 180 (2013) (agreeing with Professor Teachout that the purpose of the For-
eign Emoluments Clause was to prevent corruption).  But see Amandeep S. Grewal, The Purposes 
of the Foreign Emoluments Clause, 59 S. TEX. L. REV. 167, 168 (2017) (discussing how historical 
materials from the founding era indicate that the Framers intended the Foreign Emoluments 
Clause to “prevent corruption,” but cautions against taking a broad purposive approach to inter-
pretation).  
 50.  ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. VI, para. 1.  
 51.  2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 389 (Max Ferrand ed., 
1911).  
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any King, Prince[,] or foreign State.”52  The provision passed “nem: con-
trad.”53 
According to Professor Zephyr Teachout’s article, Gifts, Office, and 
Corruption, the Founders were following the mold of a rule made in the 
Dutch Republic in 1651, more than 100 years before the adoption of the 
U.S. Constitution.54  The rule banned Dutch foreign ministers from receiv-
ing “any presents, directly or indirectly, in any manner or way whatever.”55  
The Dutch rule was considered somewhat “radical” by the day’s standards, 
as gifts from foreign governments were a typical part of diplomacy.56  As 
an example of the European tradition in diplomacy, a letter from Benjamin 
Franklin’s grandson, William Temple Franklin to Thomas Jefferson in 
1790, described the European custom of gift giving when an Ambassador or 
other public Minister left a court.57  The European country would give the 
diplomat a present according to how highly they were respected, or to show 
respect to their sovereign nation, and sometimes a present was given due to 
the importance of the business for which the diplomat had visited.58  Wil-
liam Temple Franklin wrote these presents consisted of “[j]ewels, [p]late, 
[t]apestry, [p]orcelain, and sometimes money.”59  A foreign government’s 
personal respect for a diplomat or the importance of the negotiations could 
impact the gift the foreign government gave the diplomat.60  For example, 
Franklin wrote that his grandfather, whom King Louis XVI of France high-
ly respected, received a gold snuff box from the King enameled with “a 
large miniature of the King set with four hundred and eight [d]iamonds of a 
beautiful water, forming a wreath round the picture and a [c]rown on the 
top.”61 
                                                          
 52.  Id.  
 53.  Id.  
 54.  Teachout, supra note 30, at 34; see also EISEN ET AL, supra note 26, at 4 (citing 
Teachout, supra note 32, at 353).  
 55.  Teachout, supra note 30, at 34 (quoting 5 JOHN BASSETT MOORE, A DIGEST OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW § 651 (1906)).  
 56.  Id.   
 57.  Letter from William Temple Franklin to Thomas Jefferson (Apr. 27, 1790), 
https://www.loc.gov/resource/mtj1.012_0397_0400/?sp=1.  Teachout cites this letter in her ac-
count of the Emoluments Clauses’ history.  See Teachout, supra note 30, at 35.   
 58.  Letter from William Temple Franklin to Thomas Jefferson, supra note 57;  Teachout, 
supra note 30, at 35 (describing a similar incident involving King Louis XVI of France’s habit of 
giving jeweled snuff boxes to diplomats, including giving one such box to Arthur Lee, who wrote 
that he was worried accepting “might excite some murmurs’” (quoting 2 RICHARD HENRY LEE, 
LIFE OF ARTHUR LEE 143 (Boston, Wells, & Lilly 1829)). 
 59.  Letter from William Temple Franklin to Thomas Jefferson, supra note 57.  
 60.  Id.  
 61.  Id.  
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During the constitutional ratification debates in Virginia, Governor 
Edmund Randolph said the Clause was added to “prevent corruption.”62  
Randolph explained that people “have a natural inherent right of receiving 
emoluments from anyone, unless they be restrained by the regulations of 
the community.”63  Randolph did not define emoluments.64  However, he 
described an “accident” that contributed to producing the restriction, where 
“[a] box was presented to our ambassador by the king of our allies.”65  This 
is likely referring to the bejeweled snuff box given to Benjamin Franklin.66  
“It was thought proper,” Randolph explained, “in order to exclude corrup-
tion and foreign influence, to prohibit any one in office from receiving or 
holding any emoluments from foreign states.”67  Randolph was illustrating 
the King of France’s gift of a gold snuff box to Franklin had the potential to 
corrupt during a time when “we were in harmony with the king of 
France.”68  Randolph went on to say, “if, at that moment . . . we had sup-
posed that he was corrupting our ambassador, it might have disturbed that 
confidence, and diminished that mutual friendship, which contributed to 
carry us through the [Revolutionary] war.”69  Governor Randolph was wor-
ried not only about the actual impact receiving the gold snuff box would 
have on Ambassador Franklin, but also about the impact receiving the gold 
snuff box without the permission of Congress could project to others who 
“had supposed” the gift was corrupting.70 
As further indication the Framers were concerned about the potential 
of undue foreign influence, the Framers debated in the 1787 Convention 
about where to vest the power to declare war and sign treaties with other na-
tions.71  Some members wanted the President alone to possess the power to 
make treaties, since they thought the President “would not dare” to make a 
treaty that was not in the best interest of the country and “from his situation 
he was more interested in making a good treaty than any other man in the 
                                                          
 62.  4 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE 
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 465–66 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed., Philadelphia, J.B. Lippincott Co. 
1836).  
 63.  Id.  
 64.  Id.  
 65.  Id. at 465.  
 66.  See supra notes 57–61 and accompanying text.  
 67.  4 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE 
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, supra note 62, at 465. 
 68.  Id.  
 69.  Id. at 465–66.  
 70.  Id. at 465; see EISEN ET AL., supra note 26, at 7.  
 71.  2 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE 
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 263–65 (Jonathan Elliot ed., Philadelphia, J.B. Lippincott Co. 1881).  
The Treaty Clause of the Constitution says the President “shall have Power, by and with the Ad-
vice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present con-
cur.”  U.S. CONST. Art II, § 2, cl. 2.   
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United States.”72  Delegate Pinckney, however, was wary of giving the 
President the sole power to make a treaty.73  He thought a President could 
be more susceptible to “foreign bribery and corruption” than a King, be-
cause unlike a monarch, “[the President’s] office is not to be permanent, but 
temporary; and he might receive a bribe which would enable him to live in 
greater splendor in another country than his own.”74  The Framers eventual-
ly agreed to give the President the power to propose treaties because the 
President is the “head of the Union, and to vest the Senate . . . with the 
power of agreeing or disagreeing to the terms proposed.”75   
The Framers were also concerned about the potential for undue influ-
ence and pressures from within the different branches of government.76  In 
the Federalist, Alexander Hamilton wrote that without careful consideration 
to the President’s salary, “the separation of the executive from the legisla-
tive [branch] would be merely nominal and nugatory.”77  Hamilton ex-
plained that if the legislature had discretion over the “salary and emolu-
ments” of the President, they “could render him as obsequious to their will 
as they might think proper to make him.”78  They could either hold back 
salary and emoluments or “tempt” the President with extreme generosity 
“to surrender at discretion his judgment to their inclinations.”79 
Hamilton thought the President should receive a set salary that would 
not change during their term.80  Hamilton also wrote, “neither the Union nor 
any of its members” would be allowed to give the President “any other 
emolument,” nor would the President be allowed to receive an emolument 
other than a set salary.81  Hamilton’s writings on the President’s compensa-
tion in the Federalist mirrors the language of the Domestic Emoluments 
Clause of the Constitution, which provides that the President “shall not re-
ceive within that Period any other Emolument from the United States, or 
any of [the States].”82  Hamilton’s idea was that a set salary, with no other 
government benefits, would make it less likely for other branches of gov-
ernment, or the states, to exert control over the president because “[t]hey 
can neither weaken his fortitude by operating on his necessities nor corrupt 
                                                          
 72.  2 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE 
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, supra note 71, at 264.   
 73.  Id.  
 74.  Id. 
 75.  Id. at 265. 
 76.  See THE FEDERALIST No. 73, at 403 (Alexander Hamilton) (Colonial Press rev. ed. 1901) 
(discussing the provision for the support of the executive branch).  
 77.  Id.  
 78.  Id.  
 79.  Id.  
 80.  Id. at 404.  
 81.  Id.  
 82.  U.S. CONST. art. II., § 1, cl. 7.  
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his integrity by appealing to his avarice.”83  To further this purpose and en-
sure the President received a set salary, the Domestic Emoluments Clause 
provides: “The President shall, at stated Times, receive for his Services, a 
Compensation, which shall neither be encreased nor diminished during the 
Period for which he shall have been elected . . . .”84  The Framers were con-
cerned about potentially corrupting forces of undue influence, both at 
home85 and abroad.86 
B.  Early Cases Involving Emoluments Issues 
Some early cases shed a light on how courts have interpreted the 
meaning of the word emoluments in the context of federal officers, but not 
in the specific context of the Emoluments Clauses.87  In Hoyt v. United 
States,88 a customs collector owed more than $200,000 to the U.S. Treas-
ury.89  A 1799 Treasury Act90 stated that customs collectors’ duties includ-
ed receiving all money paid for duties and taking all bonds for securing the 
payments.91  An Act of 182292 gave collectors “compensation in addition to 
fees and emoluments.”93  The United States Supreme Court explained that 
the Act of 1822 “limits the emoluments of an office.”94  Hoyt defined emol-
uments in the context of the statute narrowly: “What is an emolument?  It is 
a compensation for the performance of an official duty.”95  The Court refer-
enced an 1839 statute96 making appropriations for civil and diplomatic gov-
ernment expenses as providing that “no officer . . . whose salaries, or whose 
pay or emoluments, is or are fixed by law and regulations, shall receive any 
                                                          
 83.  THE FEDERALIST No. 73, at 404 (Alexander Hamilton) (rev. ed. 1901).  
 84.  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 7.  
 85.  See supra notes 76–79 and accompanying text.  
 86.  See supra notes 67–70 and accompanying text.  
 87.  See United States v. MacMillan, 253 U.S. 195, 205 (1920) (discussing whether, under a 
statute, a sum a clerk collected for his services was a fee or emolument); McLean v. United States, 
226 U.S. 374, 383 (1912) (discussing how emoluments under a statute is the perquisites of office); 
Hoyt v. United States, 51 U.S. 109, 131 (1850) (discussing how the meaning of emoluments in the 
context of an early 1800s statute is compensation for an officer’s performance of a duty).  The 
Department of Justice representing President Trump in the emoluments litigation references these 
cases in support of their argument that emoluments has a narrow, office-related meaning.  District 
of Columbia v. Trump, 315 F. Supp. 3d 875, 890 (D. Md. 2018); see also Sills, supra note 32, at 
92 (describing how the word emoluments was narrowly interpreted in Hoyt in the context of a 
statute, not an emoluments constitutional provision).  
 88.  51 U.S. 109 (1850).  
 89.  Id. at 132.  
 90.  Act of March 2, 1799, ch. 22, § 21, 1 Stat. 627, 642. 
 91.  Id.  
 92.  Act of May 7, 1822, ch. 62, § 8, 3 Stat. 684, 684.  
 93.  Hoyt, 51 U.S. at 131; § 8, 3 Stat. at 684.  
 94.  Hoyt, 51 U.S. at 131.  
 95.  Id.  
 96.  Act of March 3, 1839, ch. 82, § 3, 5 Stat. 339, 349.  
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extra allowance, or compensation, in any form whatever.”97  The Court in 
Hoyt held these Acts were a “system of legislation” against public officers’ 
claims for extra compensation and “effectively extinguish[ed] them” except 
under Congress’ authority.”98 
In United States v. MacMillan,99 the Court considered whether a clerk 
for the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois 
owed interest on the average daily balances of a bank account.100  The bank 
account consisted of the “fees and emoluments of [the clerk’s] office” and 
money litigants gave the clerk for court costs.101  The government alleged 
that the interest on the bank account was “a fee or emolument of the office 
of the clerk,” and he should have accounted for it as public money of the 
United States.102  The Court, however, held the fees and emoluments the 
clerk collected and deposited into the bank was not money or property be-
longing to the United States,103 and the interest on the sum of the fees and 
emoluments was not an emolument because of “the individual character of 
the bank deposit.”104  The Court cited United States v. Hill105 in determining 
that in this context, “a fee or emolument” is money a clerk received “for a 
service . . . pertaining to their office” or for “official services.”106 
In McLean v. United States,107 Major McLean served in the Adjutant 
General’s department from 1875 until he died in 1884.108  He was not paid 
during the eleven years between his resignation in 1864 and his reinstate-
ment in 1875.109  The Auditor of the War Department gave McLean’s wid-
ow the “pay and personal subsistence” the government owed her husband, 
but did not give the widow forage for her two horses and servants’ pay.110  
The Court held the government owed McLean’s widow the back pay and 
emoluments that the government would have paid her late husband.111  The 
Court explained the statute required accounting officers to pay all back pay 
and emoluments that would have been payable to her husband because the 
words “embrace all the compensation, perquisites and dues to which he was 
                                                          
 97.  Hoyt, 51 U.S. at 141.  
 98.  Id. at 142. 
 99.  253 U.S. 195 (1920). 
 100.  Id. at 199.  
 101.  Id.   
 102.  Id.  
 103.  Id. at 204.  
 104.  Id. at 204–05.  
 105.  120 U.S. 169 (1887). 
 106.  United States v. MacMillan, 253 U.S. 195, 205 (1920) (citing United States v. Hill, 120 
U.S. 169 (1887)).  
 107.  226 U.S. 374 (1912). 
 108.  Id. at 377.  
 109.  Id.  
 110.  Id. at 377–78. 
 111.  Id. at 381. 
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entitled as an officer,” including the widow’s claim for the forage for horses 
and servants’ pay.112  The Court found the words of the statute did not make 
a distinction between pay and emoluments.113  The Court explained the 
word emoluments was the most adequate word that could have been used 
because “[i]t especially expresses the perquisites of an office.”114 
In Hoyt, MacMillan, and McLean—cases that involved federal offi-
cials—the Supreme Court defined emoluments as the fees, dues, and com-
pensation an officer received through performing their official duties.115  
For example, interest on fees and emoluments was not deemed to be an 
emolument of office in MacMillan because of the “individual character of 
the bank deposit,”116 so the Court differentiated between services that were 
performed pertaining to a clerk’s office and services that were not.  While 
shedding some light on how the Supreme Court has interpreted the word 
emoluments, the Court, in these three cases, was not interpreting emolu-
ments in the context of the emoluments constitutional provisions.117   
C.  Executive Branch Precedent and the Emoluments Clauses 
Executive branch practice and precedent has interpreted the Emolu-
ments Clauses as it relates to the Office of the President for more than a 
hundred years.118  Every President since George Washington has turned to 
the Attorney General for “legal advice regarding a proposed action or poli-
cy.”119  The Attorney General interprets law within the Executive 
Branch.120  The Attorney General delegates to the Office of Legal Counsel 
(“OLC”) the task of giving legal advice to the President and all executive 
branch agencies.121 
As far back as 1902, the Acting U.S. Attorney General at the time, 
Henry M. Hoyt, contemplated the purpose of the Foreign Emoluments 
Clause, stating its language “has been viewed as particularly directed 
against every kind of influence by foreign governments upon officers of the 
                                                          
 112.  Id. at 379, 381. 
 113.  Id. at 381–82.  
 114.  Id. at 383.  
 115.  See supra notes 94–95, 103, 112–114.  
 116.  United States v. MacMillan, 253 U.S. 195, 204–05 (1920). 
 117.  See Sills, supra note 32, at 92.  
 118.  See infra notes 122–127.  
 119.  See Arthur H. Garrison, The Opinions by the Attorney General and the Office of Legal 
Counsel: How and Why They Are Significant, 76 ALB. L. REV. 217, 220, 235–36 (2013) (discuss-
ing how the OLC provides legal advice to the President and solves disputes over legal questions 
within the Executive Branch).  
 120.  Id. at 244.  
 121.  Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., https://www.justice.gov/olc (last visited 
Sept. 18, 2018). 
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United States, based on our historic policies as a nation.”122  Hoyt found a 
gift from Prince Henry of Prussia would not be allowed without Congress’s 
permission, even though he was not a reigning prince, because the Prince 
could potentially give “an office or title of nobility or decoration, which 
would clearly fall under the prohibition.”123  Similarly, in 1964, the OLC 
analyzed the purpose of the Domestic Emoluments Clause in answering 
whether President Kennedy’s estate could receive naval retirement pay that 
Kennedy earned while President.124  The OLC explained the Domestic 
Emoluments Clause “has to be interpreted in the light of its basic purposes 
and principles,” which is “to prevent Congress or any of the states from at-
tempting to influence the President through financial awards or penal-
ties.”125 
In President Reagan’s Ability to Receive Retirement Benefits from the 
State of California,126 the OLC determined that President Reagan’s would 
not violate the Domestic Emoluments Clause by receiving state retirement 
benefits from the State of California.127  In analyzing the Domestic Emolu-
ments Clause, the OLC started with the text, describing the word emolu-
ment as “an archaic term” with two dictionary definitions.128  Looking to 
contemporary dictionaries, the Oxford English Dictionary defined an emol-
ument as a “profit or gain arising from station, office, or employment: re-
ward, remuneration, salary,” and gave the “obsolete meanings of advantage, 
benefit, comfort.”129  Next, the OLC analyzed the history and purpose of the 
Clause, finding the Clause’s inclusion in the Constitution was motivated by 
Hamilton’s writings on a fixed presidential salary in the Federalist No. 73, 
and the incident where the King of France gave an extravagant snuff box to 
Benjamin Franklin.130  Based on historic data, the OLC determined an 
emolument had to do with “payments which have a potential of influencing 
or corrupting the integrity of the recipient.”131  This interpretation is broader 
                                                          
 122.  Gifts from Foreign Prince–Officer–Constitutional Prohibition, 24 Op. Att’y Gen. 116, 
117 (1902).  
 123.  Id. at 118 (“[E]ven a simple remembrance of courtesy . . . falls under the inclusion of 
‘any present . . . of any kind whatever.’” (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8)).  In this case, the 
question was whether gifts of portraits from the Prince of Prussia to the Navy Department, the 
Military Academy, and the Naval Academy would violate the Foreign Emoluments Clause.  Id. at 
117.  
 124.  President Reagan’s Ability to Receive Ret. Benefits from the State of Ca., 5 Op. O.L.C. 
187, 189 (1981) (citing Letter from Assistant Attorney Gen. Schler to Gen. Counsel Keller, Gen. 
Accounting Office (Oct. 13, 1964)).  
 125.  Id. at 189. 
 126.  5 Op. O.L.C. 187 (1981).  
 127.  Id. at 190.  
 128.  Id. at 188. 
 129.  Id. at 188.  The OLC noted that Webster’s Third New International Dictionary contained 
similar definitions.  Id.  
 130.  Id.; see supra Section I.A. 
 131.  5 Op. O.L.C. at 188.   
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than the office-related definition the Court used for other federal officers in 
Hoyt, MacMillan, and McLean.132  The OLC concluded Reagan’s retire-
ment benefits from the State of California were not emoluments under the 
Constitution because Reagan had “acquired a vested right” to those benefits 
six years before he became President.133  According to the OLC, the retire-
ment benefits were not emoluments in the context of the Emoluments 
Clauses because “such receipt does not violate the spirit of the Constitution 
because they do not subject the President to any improper influence.”134  
Essentially, the OLC found that because the retirement benefits were not 
gifts135 and were fully vested, they did not have the potential to unduly in-
fluence or corrupt President Reagan.136  The OLC’s opinion in the case of 
Reagan’s retirement benefits is similar to the approach taken in earlier opin-
ions,137 where the OLC interpreted the purpose of the Clauses and asked 
whether the benefit had the potential of corrupting or unduly influencing the 
recipient.138 
In Application of the Emoluments Clause of the Constitution and the 
Foreign Gifts and Decorations Act,139 the OLC considered whether an em-
ployee of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission who worked with the Mexi-
can government could do short-term work with an American consulting 
firm that received payments from the Mexican government.140  The OLC 
found the employee of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission would be in vi-
olation of the Foreign Emoluments Clause if he received payments from an 
American consulting firm for his services in connection with the construc-
tion of a power plant in Mexico if the Mexican government was the actual 
source of payment.141  The OLC reasoned the Mexican government had “ul-
timate control, including selection of personnel.”142 
In Applicability of the Emoluments Clause to Non-Government Mem-
bers of ACUS,143 the OLC found profits an Administrative Conference144 
                                                          
 132.  See supra Section I.B. 
 133.  5 Op. O.L.C. at 191, 192. 
 134.  Id. at 192.  
 135.  Id. at 191. 
 136.  Id. at 192.  
 137.  See supra text accompanying notes 122–125.  
 138.  5 Op. O.L.C. at 192. 
 139.  6 Op. O.L.C. 156 (1982). 
 140.  Id.    
 141.  Id. at 158–59.   
 142.  Id. at 158.  The OLC suggested that the Emoluments Clauses were intended to have a 
broad reach beyond diplomats and ambassadors: “Even though the Framers may have had the ex-
ample of high officials such as ‘foreign Ministers’ in mind when discussing the clause . . . its poli-
cy would appear to be just as important as applied to subordinates.”  Id.  
 143.  17 Op. O.L.C. 114 (1993).  
 144.  The Administrative Conference is made up of no more than 100 members, including “a 
Chairman appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate, the chair-
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member earned through a partnership that included money the firm received 
“from representing its foreign governmental clients” turned the partnership 
into what “would in effect be a conduit for that [foreign] government.”145  
The OLC noted, “some portion of the member’s income could fairly be at-
tributed to a foreign government,” and this income was not allowed under 
the Foreign Emoluments Clause.146  The 1993 OLC opinion interpreted 
emoluments as encompassing more than gifts; emoluments could be any 
payment or benefit received from a foreign government, including proceeds 
from a partnership, if that money came from a foreign government.147 
In Applicability of the Emoluments Clause and the Foreign Gifts and 
Decorations Act to the President’s Receipt of the Nobel Peace Prize,148 the 
OLC determined the Nobel Peace Prize, which the Nobel Committee 
awards, was not an emolument under the Foreign Emoluments Clause.149  
The OLC determined the Nobel Committee was not a “King, Prince, or for-
eign State,” and the Nobel Committee did not have the kind of ties to for-
eign governments that would make it an instrumentality of a foreign 
state.150  The OLC described how going back to 1906, six federal officers 
accepted the Nobel Peace Prize during the time they were in office without 
the consent of Congress.151  The OLC used this historical record as rein-
forcement that many acceptances of the Nobel Peace Prize were not in vio-
lation of the Foreign Emoluments Clause.152  “To be sure,” the OLC ex-
plained, “this long, unbroken practice of high federal officials accepting the 
Nobel Peace Prize without congressional consent cannot dictate the out-
come, . . . [b]ut we do think such practice strongly supports the conclusion 
that the President’s receipt of the Nobel Peace Prize would not conflict with 
the Emoluments Clause.”153   
The OLC opinions demonstrate that the Executive Branch operated 
under the understanding that the Foreign Emoluments Clause applied to the 
Office of the Presidency.154  Moreover, the OLC construed the Emoluments 
Clauses to encompass not just fees or gifts, but any payment or benefit from 
a foreign government wherein the foreign government exerted control over 
                                                          
man . . .of each regulatory board or commission, the head . . . of each executive department or 
other administrative agency which is designated by the President” among others.  Id. at 115.  
 145.  Id. at 119.  
 146.  Id.  
 147.  Id.  
 148.  33 Op. O.L.C. 1 (2009). 
 149.  Id. at 1.  
 150.  Id. at 6–7.  In this case, the OLC did not find that a foreign government exerted control or 
influence over the Nobel Peace Prize.  Id. at 9.   
 151.  Id. at 11.  
 152.  Id. at 7.  
 153.  Id. at 6.  
 154.  See supra notes 124–125, 134, 149 and accompanying text.  
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the payment or benefit155 and that payment had the potential to unduly in-
fluence or corrupt the officer.156    
D.  The Emoluments Clauses Litigation 
In recent litigation, the meaning and application of the Foreign and 
Domestic Emoluments Clauses is being put to the test, as for the first time, 
the constitutional provisions are being applied to a sitting President.  Three 
separate lawsuits allege that President Trump’s interest in his hotels157 pos-
es Emoluments Clauses violations.  In Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics 
in Washington v. Trump158 the United States District Court for the Southern 
District of New York determined a government watchdog group and a res-
taurant employee association did not have standing to sue the President for 
alleged Emoluments Clauses violations, and, therefore, the court did not 
reach the merits on the emoluments issues.159  In District of Columbia v. 
Trump, however, the Maryland Federal District Court held the State of 
Maryland and the District of Columbia had Article III and prudential stand-
ing to sue, they had stated a plausible claim, and the matter was not a politi-
cal question.160  In the third case, Blumenthal v. Trump,161 the United States 
District Court for the District of Columbia held a group of Democratic 
Congressmembers had standing to sue the President.162 
1.  Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Washington v. Trump 
Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Washington v. Trump was the 
first lawsuit filed on the emoluments issue.  The plaintiffs—CREW,163 
ROC United,164 Jill Phaneuf,165 and Eric Goode166—alleged Trump’s busi-
                                                          
 155.  Applicability of the Emoluments Clause to Non-Government Members of ACUS, 17 Op. 
O.L.C. 114, 119 (1993); Applicability of the Emoluments Clause and the Foreign Gifts and Deco-
rations Act to the President’s Receipt of the Nobel Peace Prize, 33 Op. O.L.C. 1, 8 (2009). 
 156.  President Reagan’s Ability to Receive Ret. Benefits from the State of Cal., 5 Op. O.L.C. 
187, 192; (1981); see supra note 131.  
 157.  See supra notes 8–12, 17–28. 
 158.  276 F. Supp. 3d 174 (S.D.N.Y. 2017).  
 159.  Id. at 179.  See infra Section I.D.1. 
 160.  District of Columbia v. Trump, 291 F. Supp. 3d 725, 756, 757 (D. Md. 2018); see infra 
Section I.D.2.  
 161.  335 F. Supp. 3d 45 (D.D.C. 2018).  
 162.  Id. at 64, 65. 
 163.  CREW’s mission is to “protect[] the rights of citizens to be informed about the activities 
of government officials, ensur[e] the integrity of government officials, protect[] [the] political sys-
tem against corruption, and reduc[e] the influence of money in politics.”  Citizens for Responsibil-
ity & Ethics in Wash., 276 F. Supp. 3d at 180.   
 164.  ROC United is a nonprofit with nearly 25,000 restaurant employees.  Id. at 180.  
 165.  Phaneuf focuses on hospitality and plans embassy functions.  Id. 
 166.  Goode is the owner of several hotels, bars, restaurants, and event spaces in New York 
City.  Id.  
 2019] INTERPRETING EMOLUMENTS TODAY 1015 
ness interests in New York City created conflicts of interest that violated 
the Foreign and Domestic Emoluments Clauses.167  They alleged that for-
eign diplomats frequented the Trump Hotel in Washington, D.C.; the King-
dom of Saudi Arabia had bought property in the Trump Tower in New York 
City “over the last two decades;” and the Industrial and Commercial Bank 
of China, a Chinese state-owned bank, was “one of the largest tenants of 
Trump Tower” in New York City.168  The plaintiffs also alleged the lease 
that allowed the Trump Hotel to rent the Old Post Office Building, a federal 
property, ran afoul of the Domestic Emoluments Clause.169  Phaneuf and 
Goode claimed the President’s continued stake in his hotel businesses, and 
the business these hotels and restaurants received from foreign “govern-
mental sources” was increasing competition and hurting Phaneuf and 
Goode’s bottom line.170  ROC United alleged its members suffered business 
losses, as well171  CREW’s stated injury for standing purposes was that it 
suffered harm from having to allocate resources away from other potential 
issues in order to fight for the emoluments issues.172 
The Federal District Court in the Southern District of New York found 
the hospitality plaintiffs failed to show President Trump’s actions caused 
their competitive injury, and the injury was not redressable in court.173  The 
court found it was “wholly speculative” whether their loss of business was 
traceable to the President “or instead result[ed] from government officials’ 
independent desire to patronize [the] [d]efendant’s businesses.”174  The 
court did not view a competitive injury as falling within the “zone of inter-
ests” of the Foreign Emoluments Clause because “[n]othing in the text or 
the history of the Emoluments Clauses suggests that the Framers intended 
these provisions to protect anyone from competition.”175  Rather, the court 
stated the Framers intended the Clauses to protect government from “cor-
ruption and undue influence”176  The court held that CREW’s claims should 
be dismissed because the organization did not have an injury.177 
                                                          
 167.  Id. at 179, 180.   
 168.  Id. at 182.  
 169.  Id. at 183.  
 170.  Id.  Thus, the plaintiffs claimed competitive injuries for standing purposes.  Id.  
 171.  Id.  
 172.  Id.  
 173.  Id. at 185.  
 174.  Id. at 186.  
 175.  Id. at 187.  
 176.  Id.  In holding the hospitality plaintiffs’ competitive injury did not fall within the “zone 
of interests” of the Emoluments Clauses, the court pointed out that increased competition could 
happen even if Congress consented to the operation of the Trump hotels and restaurants, leaving 
the plaintiffs with “no cognizable claim to redress in court.”  Id. at 188.  
 177.  Id.  
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The court then turned to the political question doctrine.178  The court 
held that the case presented a non-justiciable political question and should 
be left to Congress179:  “As the only political branch with the power to con-
sent to violations of the Foreign Emoluments Clause, Congress is the ap-
propriate body to determine whether, and to what extent, [the President’s] 
conduct unlawfully infringes on that power.”180  The court also decided the 
claim was not yet ripe because it involved a conflict between two co-equal 
branches of government that had not matured.181  Currently, the case is un-
der appeal in the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.182 
2.  District of Columbia v. Trump 
In District of Columbia v. Trump, the United States District Court for 
the District of Maryland took a different approach towards standing and the 
political question doctrine.183  The Attorneys General for the District of Co-
lumbia and the State of Maryland filed a lawsuit on June 12, 2017, alleging 
the President’s interests in the Trump Organization and the Trump Hotel in 
Washington, D.C. harmed Washington D.C.’s and Maryland’s “sovereign, 
quasi-sovereign, proprietary, and parens patriae interests.”184   
The Amended Complaint to the case claimed, in part, the Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia “spent thousands of dollars on rooms, catering, and parking” 
at the Trump Hotel from January to February of 2017.185  Also, according to 
the Amended Complaint, the Trump Hotel allegedly marketed to diplomats 
by hiring a “director of diplomatic sales” and holding “an event . . . 
pitch[ing] the Hotel to about 100 foreign diplomats.”186  A Middle-Eastern 
diplomat reportedly told the Washington Post, “Believe me, all the delega-
tions will go there,” and an Asian diplomat reportedly echoed that senti-
ment about the Trump Hotel saying, “Isn’t it rude to come to his city and 
say, ‘I am staying at your competitor?’”187  The Maryland Federal District 
Court held Washington, D.C. and Maryland had standing to sue188 with re-
spect to the alleged Emoluments Clauses violations involving the Trump 
Hotel in Washington, D.C. only, and had “sufficiently alleged that the Pres-
ident is violating the Foreign and Domestic Emoluments Clauses . . . by 
                                                          
 178.  Id. at 193.  
 179.  Id.   
 180.  Id.  
 181.  Id. at 194. 
 182.  Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Wash. v. Trump, 276 F. Supp. 3d 174 (S.D.N.Y. 
2017), appeal filed, No. 18-474 (2d Cir. Feb. 16, 2018).  
 183.  District of Columbia v. Trump, 291 F. Supp. 3d 725, 757 (D. Md. 2018). 
 184.  Id. at 732.  
 185.  Amended Complaint, supra note 16, at 15–16.  
 186.  Id. at 14.  
 187.  Id. at 14–15.  
 188.  Trump, 291 F. Supp. 3d at 757. 
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reason of his involvement with and receipt of benefits from the Trump In-
ternational Hotel . . . as well as the operations of the Trump Organization 
with respect to the same.”189   
The State of Maryland alleged injuries to its sovereign interests be-
cause the Emoluments Clauses were “material inducements to its decision 
to enter the Union.”190  In other words, Maryland argued that it entered the 
Union, in 1776, as a state in part because of the Clauses.191  Next, Maryland 
and the District of Columbia alleged injuries to their “quasi-sovereign inter-
ests” because they have an interest in enforcing their respective tax, zoning, 
and land use laws.192  The plaintiffs also claimed injuries to their proprie-
tary interests.193  The Walter E. Washington Convention Center, the Wash-
ington Convention Center and Sports Authority, and the Carnegie Library 
“directly compete with the Hotel.”194  Similarly, the Montgomery County 
Conference Center in the Bethesda North Marriott Hotel and the MGM Ho-
tel in the National Harbor in Oxen Hill, Maryland also compete with the 
Trump Hotel for government business and patronage.195  Washington, D.C. 
and Maryland argued the Trump Hotel has “illegally skewed the hospitality 
market in [President Trump’s] favor.”196 
Lastly, Washington, D.C and the State of Maryland claimed parens 
patriae rights197 to sue because companies and their employees lost oppor-
tunities to conduct business with diplomats due to competition from the 
Trump Hotel.198  The remedy Washington, D.C. and Maryland sought was 
declaratory and injunctive relief.199  While the court rejected the claim that 
Maryland had suffered an injury to its sovereign interests, it agreed with 
Washington, D.C. and Maryland that they had sufficiently alleged injuries 
                                                          
 189.  Id. at 757, 758. 
 190.  Id. at 735. 
 191.  Id.  
 192.  Id.  Washington, D.C. and Maryland claimed the President’s alleged receipt of emolu-
ments from other states force the states to choose between granting exemptions or waivers to the 
Trump Organization, such as tax reductions, for activities conducted in Maryland and Washing-
ton, D.C. and risk losing revenue, or denying the Trump Organization’s requests and risk being 
placed at a disadvantage compared to other states that have agreed to grant concessions.  Id. at 735 
& n.7.  
 193.  Id. at 735.  
 194.  Id.  
 195.  Id. at 735–36.  
 196.  Id. at 736.  
 197.  Parens patriae means “parent of the country.”  Id. at 736 n.9 (citing Alfred L. Snapp & 
Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, ex. rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 600 (1982)).  It refers to a state’s right as a 
sovereign to sue as a guardian of its residents.  Id.; see Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 520 
(2007) (“Given that procedural right and Massachusetts’ stake in protecting its quasi-sovereign 
interests, the Commonwealth is entitled to special solicitude in our standing analysis.”).  
 198.  Trump, 291 F. Supp. 3d at 736.  
 199.  Id. at 732.  
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to their quasi-sovereign, proprietary, and parens patriae interests.200  Wash-
ington, D.C. and Maryland had stated a plausible claim that Emoluments 
Clauses violations had left them with an “inability to compete on an equal 
footing” with the Trump Hotel’s operations in Washington, D.C.201  This 
alleged loss of competition established Article III standing regarding the 
Trump Hotel.202  These competitive injuries, the court found, could be plau-
sibly traced to President Trump, considering the alleged statements from 
foreign government officials, including one where an official said they 
chose the Hotel because they wanted the President to know they “love [his] 
new hotel.”203  The court also found the injuries could be redressable 
through appropriate injunctive and declaratory relief if the plaintiffs suc-
ceeded on the merits.204 
The court turned to prudential standing and concluded the language of 
the Foreign Emoluments Clause was not a “textually demonstrable constitu-
tional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department.”205  In 
Baker v. Carr,206 the Supreme Court listed several other factors for pruden-
tial standing, but the Maryland Federal District Court did not analyze those 
factors in depth.207  Instead, the Maryland Federal District Court leaped to 
the political question doctrine, determining it is the court’s job to decide 
“whether the President has acted within the law.”208  Unlike in Citizens for 
Responsibility & Ethics in Washington v. Trump, where the court held the 
case should be left for Congress to resolve under the political question doc-
trine, the court in District of Columbia v. Trump held the political question 
doctrine did not apply.209 
For the first time, a federal court had reached the merits in interpreting 
the Foreign and Domestic Emoluments Clauses in the Constitution and 
needed to decide if the plaintiffs had stated a claim under the Clauses.210  
To interpret the Clauses, the court used an original public meaning and pur-
                                                          
 200.  Id. at 752–53.  
 201.  Id. at 743.  The court explained, “plaintiffs with an economic interest have standing to 
sue to prevent a direct competitor from receiving an illegal market benefit leading to an unlawful 
increase in competition” when a plaintiff shows it is “sufficiently injured by the competition . . . to 
create a case or controversy.”  Id. at 744 (alteration in original) (quoting Inv. Co. Inst. v. Camp, 
401 U.S. 617, 620 (1971)).  
 202.  Id. at 742.  The court found it much harder to believe there would be an “actual or immi-
nent injury to either plaintiff . . . with respect to the decision of the State of Florida or any other 
State to patronize the Trump Organization’s Mar-a-Lago” in Palm Beach.  Id.  
 203.  Id. at 749–50.  
 204.  Id. at 752–53.  
 205.  Id. at 756 (quoting Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 566 U.S. 189, 195 (2012)).  
 206.  369 U.S. 186 (1962).  
 207.  Id. at 217.  
 208.  Trump, 291 F. Supp. 3d at 757 (quoting Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 703 (1997)).  
 209.  Id. at 756.  Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Wash. v. Trump, 276 F. Supp. 3d 174, 
193, 194 (S.D.N.Y. 2017). 
 210.  District of Columbia v. Trump, 315 F. Supp. 3d 875, 878 (D. Md. 2018).  
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posive approach.211  It was a battle of the dictionary definitions.212  Wash-
ington, D.C. and Maryland referenced dictionary definitions from the 
Founding Era213 and closely analyzed the word choice within the Foreign 
Emoluments Clause, including the use of “any kind whatever” to modify 
“Emolument.”214  Washington, D.C. and Maryland argued there were two 
definitions of emoluments at the time of the Founding.215  The most com-
mon definition was that emoluments meant “profit,” “gain,” or “ad-
vantage.”216  The second, less common, definition was “‘profit arising from 
an office or employ’ with ‘employ’ defined as ‘a person’s trade, [or] busi-
ness.’”217  The Department of Justice (“DOJ”) representing the President, in 
his official capacity, used dictionary definitions from the Founding Era218 
that supported an office-related definition of an emolument as “a profit aris-
ing from an office or employ.”219  The President argued that under that def-
inition, the benefit “must be predicated on services rendered in an official 
capacity or an employment (or equivalent) relationship and be given in ex-
change for the provision of a service in that relationship.”220  For example, 
an emolument would be a foreign government paying a federal official to 
take certain official actions.221 
The court dismissed the argument that presidents do not hold an “Of-
fice of Profit or Trust under [the United States].”222  The court found that a 
broad interpretation of the meaning of the word emolument223 fit because 
                                                          
 211.  Id. at 881.  Both parties were in favor of this interpretive approach.  Id.  
 212.  Id. at 880.  
 213.  Id.; Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Motion to Dismiss at 
31–33, District of Columbia v. Trump, 291 F. Supp. 3d 725 (D. Md. 2018), 315 F. Supp. 3d 875 
(D. Md. 2018) (No. 18:17-cv-01596-PJM).  
 214.  Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Motion to Dismiss, supra 
note 213, at 33.   
 215.  Id. at 31–32.  
 216.  Id. at 31 (first quoting 1 SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 
(6th ed., London 1785); and then quoting N. BAILEY, AN UNIVERSAL ETYMOLOGICAL ENGLISH 
DICTIONARY (20th ed., London 1763)).  
 217.  Id. at 32 (alternation in original) (quoting BARCLAY, A COMPLETE AND UNIVERSAL 
ENGLISH DICTIONARY ON A NEW PLAN (n.p. 1774)).  The second definition appeared in less than 
eight percent of Founding Era dictionaries.  Id. (citing John Mikhail, The Definition of “Emolu-
ment” in English Language and Legal Dictionaries, 1523–1806, at 1, 2 (July 12, 2017) (un-
published manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2995693).  
 218.  Trump, 315 F. Supp. 3d at 880; Memorandum in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dis-
miss at 32, District of Columbia v. Trump, 291 F. Supp. 3d 725 (D. Md. 2018), 315 F. Supp. 3d 
875 (D. Md. 2018) (No. 8:17-cv-1596-PJM) (defining “emolument” as a “profit arising from an 
office or employ” (quoting BARCLAY, supra note 217)).  
 219.  Trump, 315 F. Supp. 3d at 880.  
 220.  Memorandum in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, supra note 218, at 32.  
 221.  Id. at 32–33 (“In either case, the benefit would be predicated on the official’s rendering 
of services pursuant to an office or employment.”).  
 222.  Trump, 315 F. Supp. 3d at 883.   
 223.  Id. at 889 (“‘[P]rofit,’ ‘gain,’ or ‘advantage’ from any kind of exchange . . . .”).  
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the narrower, office-related definition of emoluments would be equivalent 
to “federal bribery,” which is an impeachable offense.224  Federal bribery 
involves a quid pro quo, where a public official, directly or indirectly, re-
ceives or accepts anything of value from someone in exchange for doing a 
favor for them.225  The court found it would be redundant to include Emol-
uments Clauses preventing presidents from accepting money from foreign 
governments in exchange for official services when Article II, Section 4 of 
the Constitution does the same.226   
Citing scholarship about the Framers’ anti-corruption purposes, the 
Maryland Federal District Court determined the Framers “unquestionably” 
adopted the Foreign Emoluments Clause because they were worried about 
undue foreign influence.227  Further, the court found the OLC opinions sup-
ported a definition of emoluments that encompassed the broader definition 
of “any profits” from foreign governments.228  The court defined emolu-
ments broadly as “any profit, gain, or advantage, of more than de minimis 
value, received by [the President], directly or indirectly, from foreign, the 
federal, or domestic governments.”229  Then, the court held the plaintiffs’ 
allegations plausibly stated a claim under the Foreign Emoluments Clause 
because Trump had received, or potentially could receive, profits from for-
eign governments without the consent of Congress.230  The court also held  
the lease between President Trump and the GSA for the Trump Hotel in the 
Old Post Office Building constituted an emolument in violation of the Do-
mestic Emoluments Clause.231  The DOJ on behalf of the President in his 
official capacity filed an interlocutory appeal and a stay pending appeal of 
the court’s decisions.232 
The Fourth Circuit granted the President’s petition for mandamus and 
stayed the lawsuit in December 2018, holding oral argument in March 
                                                          
 224.  Id.  The court cited McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355 (2016), where the Gov-
ernor of Virginia received cash and in-kind benefits from constituents, as demonstrating the diffi-
culty of determining what constitutes an “official act sufficient to establish a criminal quid pro 
quo.”  Id. at 898 (citing McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2372).  The Court in McDonnell held that a 
criminal quid pro quo required more than simply holding a meeting, speaking to another official, 
or organizing an event.  Id. (citing McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2372). 
 225.  Id. at 889 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(2) (2012)).  
 226.  Id.  The U.S. Constitution provides, “The President, Vice President and all civil Officers 
of the United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Trea-
son, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.”  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.  
 227.  Trump, 315 F. Supp. 3d at 896 (first citing Teachout, supra note 32, at 361; then citing 
Sills, supra note 32, at 72; then citing James D. Savage, Corruption and Virtue at the Constitu-
tional Convention, 56 J. Pol’y 174, 174–76, 181–82 (1994)).  
 228.  Id. at 900; see supra Section I.C. 
 229.  Id. at 904.  
 230.  Id. at 905–06.  
 231.  Id. at 906.  
 232.  Id.  
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2019.233  During oral argument, a Fourth Circuit panel of three judges di-
rected questions towards Maryland and Washington, D.C., including 
whether a state could bring a suit against any other officer, such as a Secre-
tary of State, for accepting an emolument234 and exactly what type of in-
junctive relief Maryland and Washington, D.C. were requesting other than 
divestment.235  The Fourth Circuit panel was interested in whether Mary-
land and Washington, D.C. had stated a claim under the Emoluments 
Clauses and whether anything other than divestment could satisfy their re-
quest for injunctive relief.236 
3.  Blumenthal v. Trump 
In Blumenthal v. Trump,237 201 Democratic members of Congress 
sued the President in his official capacity for allegedly violating the Foreign 
Emoluments Clause.238  As in District of Columbia v. Trump, the United 
States District Court for the District of Columbia issued a stand-alone opin-
ion addressing the threshold question of standing.239  The court similarly 
held the plaintiffs had standing.240  The congressmembers alleged they suf-
fered a concrete injury when the President denied them the opportunity to 
vote on whether to approve his alleged receipt of emoluments.241  The Pres-
ident argued the case was essentially a political spat between Congress and 
the Executive Branch that did not belong in court because Congress could 
convince a majority in both Houses to pass legislation about the emolu-
ments issues.242 
The legislators stated Trump had not given Congress an opportunity to 
consent to any foreign emoluments he had received.243  Without the chance 
to give or withhold consent, the congressmembers argued they could not 
“force the President to comply with the Constitution absent a judicial or-
der.”244  The President argued plaintiffs could enact legislation on the 
emoluments issue if they had the votes.245   
                                                          
 233.  Dave Simpson, 4th Cir. Stays DC., Md. Emoluments Suit Against Trump, LAW360 (Dec. 
20, 2018), https://www.law360.com/articles/1113963/4th-circ-stays-dc-md-emoluments-suit-
against-trump. 
 234.  Oral Argument at 10:12, Trump, 315 F. Supp. 3d 875 (No. 18-2486), 
https://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/OAarchive/mp3/18-2486-20190319.mp3.  
 235.  Id. at 30:33.  
 236.  Id.  
 237.  335 F. Supp. 3d 45 (D. D.C. 2018).  
 238.  Id. at 50.   
 239.  Id.; District of Columbia v. Trump, 291 F. Supp. 3d 725, 732 (D. Md. 2018).  
 240.  Blumenthal, 335 F. Supp. 3d at 50; Trump, 291 F. Supp. 3d. at 732.  
 241.  Blumenthal, 335 F. Supp. 3d at 50.  
 242.  Id. at 50–51.  
 243.  Id. at 51.  
 244.  Id. (citations omitted). 
 245.  Id. at 63.  
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The court found the plaintiffs had plausibly alleged an injury as mem-
bers of Congress because the President had, in effect, nullified the Congress 
members’ votes when he did not ask for Congress’s consent before alleged-
ly accepting foreign emoluments.246  The court held separations-of-powers 
principles did not prevent the plaintiffs from having standing because 
emoluments are prohibited without Congress’s consent, so it is up to the 
President to ask for that consent, rather than the other way around.247  Blu-
menthal v. Trump illustrated a different view on the possibility of a legisla-
tive remedy and the role of the courts in resolving the problem than Citizens 
for Responsibility & Ethics in Washington v. Trump, which held the case 
was not appropriate for judicial review under the political question doctrine 
until Congress asserted its authority on the matter.248 
II.  ANALYSIS 
District of Columbia v. Trump marks the first time a federal court has 
interpreted the Foreign and Domestic Emoluments Clauses and how they 
apply to the President.  This Comment argues the courts in the emoluments 
litigation249 and executive branch practice and precedent250 correctly recog-
nized the purpose of the Emoluments Clauses is to prevent corruption and 
undue influence on federal officials.251  Section II.A. analyzes the original-
ist and purposive approach to interpretation the parties in recent Emolu-
ments Clause litigation have taken, and analyzes their use of Founding-Era 
dictionaries to support a broad or narrow definition of an emolument.252  
Section II.B discusses how a living approach to interpretation would ask: 
What are today’s emoluments and how have modern-day Presidents treated 
potential conflicts of interests?253  Section II.C. analyzes how a moral read-
ing approach would view the Emoluments Clauses as embodying an ab-
stract anti-corruption principle254 and would allow for normative judgments 
about how the Clauses should best be understood, independent of what the 
Framers may have thought.255  As the first case to reach the merits, these 
Sections focus mostly on District of Columbia v. Trump. 
                                                          
 246.  Id. at 66.  
 247.  Id. at 67.  
 248.  Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Wash. v. Trump, 276 F. Supp. 3d 174, 193–94 
(S.D.N.Y. 2017); see supra notes 178–181 and accompanying text.  
 249.  See supra Section I.D.1–3.  
 250.  See supra Section I.C. 
 251.  See supra text accompanying notes 36. 
 252.  See infra Section II.A.  
 253.  See infra Section II.B. 
 254.  See Teachout, supra note 32, at 342, 343.  
 255.  See infra Section II.C. 
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A.  The Textualist and Originalist Approach to the Emoluments 
Clauses 
The parties in District of Columbia v. Trump took a textualist and 
originalist approach to constitutional interpretation.256  Central to plaintiffs 
Washington, D.C. and Maryland’s argument is an originalist question at 
heart: What did the Framers intend the Emoluments Clauses to mean?257   
1.  Textualism 
In order to interpret the Emoluments Clauses, courts start with the text 
itself.258  Under a textualist approach, when the text is unambiguous and 
clear, “there is no room for construction” and courts should look to a word 
or phrase’s ordinary meaning259  In District of Columbia v. Trump, both 
Washington, D.C., Maryland, and the DOJ lawyers representing the Presi-
dent analyzed the plain language of the Foreign Emoluments Clause, using 
Founding-Era dictionaries in order to ascertain the ordinary meaning of the 
word emolument at the time of the Founding.260  As Justice Scalia described 
the philosophy of textualism, “A text . . . should be construed reasonably, to 
contain all that it fairly means.”261  The fact that both the plaintiffs and de-
fendant closely examined the text of the constitutional provisions demon-
strates how prevalent and mainstream the textualist approach is today.  As 
Professor Victoria Nourse points out, Justice Kagan said, “[W]e are all con-
stitutional textualists and originalists now.” 262   
Black’s Law Dictionary defines an emolument as “[a]ny advantage, 
profit, or gain received as a result of one’s employment or one’s holding of 
office.”263  The word “emolument” in Webster’s Dictionary has two mean-
ings: “the returns arising from office or employment usually in the form of 
                                                          
 256.  District of Columbia v. Trump, 315 F. Supp. 3d 875, 881 (D. Md. 2018) (“Both sides 
embrace a blend of original public meaning and purposive analysis”).  
 257.  EISEN ET AL., supra note 26, at 2.  
 258.  Trump, 315 F. Supp. 3d at 881 (citing City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519 
(1997)); see also United States v. Sprague, 282 U.S. 716, 731–32 (1931).  
 259.  United States v. Sprague, 282 U.S. 716, 731–32 (1931) (citing Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 
14 U.S. 304, 326 (1816)); see Martin, 14 U.S. at 326 (“The words are to be taken in their natural 
and obvious sense, and not in a sense unreasonably restricted or enlarged.”).  
 260.  See Trump, 315 F. Supp. 3d at 886–887; supra Section I.C. 
 261.  ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 
(1997), reprinted in CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY: ARGUMENTS AND PERSPECTIVES 177, 178 (Mi-
chael J. Gerhardt et al. eds., 3d ed. 2007).  
 262.  See Victoria Nourse, Reclaiming the Constitutional Text from Originalism: The Case of 
Executive Power, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 3 n.3 (2018) (quoting Justice Elena Kagan, The Scalia 
Lecture: A Dialogue with Justice Kagan on the Reading of Statutes, at 8:29, HARV. L. TODAY 
(Nov. 25, 2015), http://today.law.harvard.edu/in-scalia-lecture-kagan-discusses-statutory-
interpretation/); see also Coyle, supra note 34. 
 263.  Emolument, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).  
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compensation or prerequisites” and “advantage.”264  Synonyms include: 
“hire,” “pay,” “salary,” “stipend,” and “wage.”265 
The text of the Foreign Emoluments Clause contains no definition of 
the word emoluments. Thus, using a textualist approach, the court in Dis-
trict of Columbia v. Trump reasonably interpreted the word emoluments to 
give it its ordinary meaning and encompass all it could fairly mean.266  Both 
current and Founding-Era dictionary definitions provide support for a defi-
nition of emoluments as reaching any “profit,” “gain,” or “advantage.”267  
Moreover, there are numerous examples of the Framers using the word 
emoluments as encompassing a general benefit during their debates.268  In 
support of an office-related definition of emoluments, President Trump ar-
gued, in the Domestic Emoluments Clause, the word compensation is next 
to the words “for his services,” indicating that any provision with the word 
emolument in it is impliedly qualified by the words “for his services.”269  
He argued that under the noscitur a sociis270 rule of statutory construction, a 
word should be read in context with the other words surrounding it in a 
provision, such as the words “present,” “Office,” and “Title” in the Foreign 
Emoluments Clause.271  The President argued that interpreting emolument 
to cover any profit, gain, or advantage would be redundant since the word 
“present,” has its own distinct, relatively straightforward meaning as a 
gift.272   
Professor Grewal argues the office-related definition is more con-
sistent with the text of the Emoluments Clause.273  According to Grewal, 
“broad purposes may have animated the introduction and ratification of the 
clause, but, for purposes of constitutional interpretation, the only relevant 
                                                          
 264.  Emolument, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/emolument (last visited Mar. 1, 2019).  
 265.  Id.  
 266.  See supra text accompanying notes 260–261. 
 267.  District of Columbia v. Trump, 315 F. Supp. 3d 875, 880 (D. Md. 2018).   
 268.  4 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE 
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, supra note 62, at 24 (“The highest honors and emoluments of this 
commonwealth are a poor compensation for the surrender of personal independence.”); id. at 36 
(“[T]he conqueror will take care of his own emoluments, and have little concern for the interest of 
the people.”); id. at 66 (“Cast your eyes to your seaports: see how commerce languishes.  This 
country, so blessed, by nature, with every advantage that can render commerce profitable, through 
defective legislation is deprived of all the benefits and emoluments she might otherwise reap from 
it.”); id. at 127 (“In other countries, where the fate of the poor is wretched, officers are created 
merely for the emolument of certain individuals . . . .”).  
 269.  Trump, 315 F. Supp. 3d at 887.  
 270.  Noscitur a sociis is a Latin term meaning “it is known by the company it keeps” and is 
“the concept that the intended meaning of an ambiguous word depends on the context in which it 
is used.”  What is NOSCITUR A SOCIIS, LAW DICTIONARY, https://thelawdictionary.org/noscitur-
a-sociis/ (last visited June 20, 2019); see U.S. CONST. art I, § 9, cl. 8.  
 271.  Trump, 315 F. Supp. 3d at 886–887. 
 272.  Id. at 887. 
 273.  Grewal, supra note 49, at 169.  
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purpose is that embodied in the text itself.”274  Even looking beyond the 
purpose of the Clauses and just at the text itself, the Maryland Federal Dis-
trict Court reasonably found the expansive modifiers of “of any kind what-
ever” indicates the words in context with the other words in the Emolu-
ments Clauses should be broadly construed.275  Even though there are 
narrower meanings of the word emolument in dictionary definitions today, 
the word emolument was frequently used in contexts outside of the narrow, 
office-related definition.276  Moreover, the plain meaning of the text of the 
Foreign Emoluments Clause does not expressly limit the Clause’s applica-
tion to only civil officers and not the President.  The Clause says, “no Per-
son holding any Office of Profit or Trust.”277  Elected officials are not ex-
pressly excluded from the language of the Clause itself.278  In reaching the 
merits, the court in District of Columbia v. Trump construed the plain 
meaning of the Foreign Emoluments Clause reasonably as having the 
broader of the two possible dictionary definitions.279 
2.  The Framers’ Intent 
Both sides rely on arguments about the Framers’ intent at the time of 
the Founding.280  While both sides ultimately came to different conclusions 
about the Framers’ intentions, neither the plaintiffs nor the President disput-
ed that the Framers’ intentions were important, if not the most important, 
piece of the emoluments puzzle.281  The DOJ, representing the President in 
the litigation, argued the Framers had no intention for the Foreign Emolu-
ments Clause to encompass profits from foreign governments in part be-
cause Delegate Pinckney, the very same Delegate to the Constitutional 
Convention who suggested adding the Foreign Emoluments Clause in the 
first place,282 ran plantations in South Carolina while serving in public of-
fice.283  Many of our earliest Presidents were plantation owners who ex-
                                                          
 274.  Id. at 169.  
 275.  Trump, 315 F. Supp. 3d at 887.   
 276.  Id. at 877, 904; see supra note 268 and accompanying text. 
 277.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8.  
 278.  See Nourse, supra note 262, at 26–27  (discussing how the term “unelected” is not ex-
pressly written in the Foreign Emoluments Clause, but scholars who argue the Foreign Emolu-
ments Clause does not apply to the President infer that the word is there). 
 279.  Trump, 315 F. Supp. 3d at 878–88.  
 280.  Id. at 881; see, e.g., EISEN ET AL., supra note 26, at 1. 
 281.  See Memorandum in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, supra note 220, at 40 
(arguing the history and purpose of the Emoluments Clauses did not have to do with private com-
mercial arrangements); see Memorandum in Law in Support of Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Motion to 
Dismiss, supra note 213, at 34 (arguing the Clauses “reflects the Framers’ insight . . . that every 
person is susceptible to being influenced . . . when receiving gifts, profits, offices, or titles”).  
 282.  See supra note 51–53 and accompanying text.  
 283.  Memorandum in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, supra note 220, at 41 (argu-
ing that at the time of the Founding, “government officials were not given generous compensa-
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ported their cash crops overseas.284  At the time of the Founding, the DOJ 
argued on behalf of the President, government officials were not always 
paid well, so many federal officials worked for the government with the un-
derstanding they would be able to work and earn money outside of office.285  
The court in District of Columbia v. Trump correctly pushed back on this, 
recognizing that the Emoluments Clauses does not ban all “private foreign 
or domestic transactions,” but rather only transactions that occur with for-
eign governments or foreign government officials without Congress’s con-
sent.286  In other words, the Clauses do not prohibit federal officials from 
running businesses; rather, they simply prohibit doing business with repre-
sentatives of foreign governments without the consent of Congress.   
 The Framers did not want ambassadors to be put in the position of re-
ceiving opulent gifts from foreign governments because of the potential for 
undue influence.287  During the time of the Founding, Benjamin Franklin’s 
grandson wrote Thomas Jefferson informing him of the tradition of ambas-
sadors and diplomats in Europe receiving opulent gifts from heads of for-
eign states simply because the heads of the foreign states respected and 
liked the ambassadors.288  In the example of the gold snuff box Franklin re-
ceived from the King of France, there is no indication that the gift was a 
quid pro quo, where the gift was in exchange for services.289  The Framers, 
however, wanted to ban these kinds of gifts without the consent of Con-
gress, because even the slightest appearance of corruption or undue foreign 
influence on an American ambassador had the potential to “disturb[] that 
confidence” and make it difficult, if not impossible, for people to know 
whether a particular ambassador was beholden to a foreign country.290  
While the court in Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Washington v. 
Trump did not reach the merits on the emoluments issue, that court also de-
termined the Framers intended the Clauses to prevent corruption.291  The 
                                                          
tions,” and many federal officials in public office operated under the assumption that they could 
still maintain their businesses ).  
 284.  Id.  
 285.  Id.  
 286.  District of Columbia v. Trump, 315 F. Supp. 3d 875, 899 (D. Md. 2018).  
 287.  See Sills, supra note 32, at 73 (“In addition to actual corruption, [Governor] Randolph 
recognized that the perception of undue influence from foreign states was as significant as actual 
foreign influence itself.”); Teachout, supra note 30, at 38 (describing how Thomas Jefferson did 
not enjoy accepting gifts while he was a diplomat in Europe, finding the tradition of exchanging 
gifts to be “distasteful”).  
 288.  See supra Section I.A. 
 289.  Letter from William Temple Franklin to Thomas Jefferson supra note 57; see Teachout, 
supra note 30, at 35. 
 290.  Cf. Teachout, supra note 30, at 34–35 (describing general disapproval of gifts in diplo-
macy during the Founders Era); see Sills, supra note 32, at 75 (describing how the Framers want-
ed to protect national security provisions through the emoluments provisions).  
 291.  Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Wash. v. Trump, 274 F. Supp. 3d 174, 186–87 
(S.D.N.Y. 2017).  
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court concluded the Clauses were included in the Constitution because of 
“the Framers’ concern with protecting the new government from corruption 
and undue influence.”292  The Framers wanted to avoid even the appearance 
of impropriety, which is why they banned the receiving of any emoluments 
without the consent of Congress.293 
In applying an originalist approach in his scholarship on the emolu-
ments issue, Professor Seth Barrett Tillman looks not only to what the 
Framers’ intended, but what they actually did as proof of what the Clauses 
should mean.294  Tillman argues the Clauses do not apply to the President 
and that the Framers did not intend to include profits and benefits received 
in connection with business transactions for value.295  Regarding the Do-
mestic Emoluments Clause and the Trump Hotel’s location in the Old Post 
Office Building, Tillman argues if the Framers intended to prevent Presi-
dents from doing business with the U.S. government, there would have 
been a problem with our first President George Washington doing business 
with the federal government and buying several lots of land in Washington, 
D.C. at a public auction.296  One such purchase occurred in September 
1793, during and auction run by three commissioners who had been in-
volved in the ratification of the Constitution.297  Tillman also describes how 
the French government gave President Washington gifts twice.298  On De-
cember 22, 1791, the French ambassador to the United States wrote Presi-
dent Washington a letter asking if he could give the President a gift of a 
new print of the King of France.299  Washington said yes, replying in a let-
ter “the new and elegant print of the King of the French, which you have 
been so obliging as to send me this morning as a mark of your attachment to 
                                                          
 292.  Id. at 187.  
 293.  See supra note 287 and accompanying text.  
 294.  See e.g., Seth Barrett Tillman, Business Transactions and President Trump’s “Emolu-
ments” Problem, 40 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 759, 761 (2017) [hereinafter Tillman, Business 
Transactions]; Tillman, supra note 49, at 188–89 (describing how President Washington received 
gifts from French leaders); Seth Barrett Tillman, Citizens United and the Scope of Professor 
Teachout’s Anti-Corruption Principle, 107 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 399, 415 (2012) [hereinaf-
ter Tillman, Citizens United].  
 295.  Tillman, Business Transactions, supra note 294, at 761.  
 296.  Id. at 761–62; see U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 7 (providing that while the President is in 
office, they “shall not receive within that Period any other Emolument from the United States, or 
any of them”).  
 297.  Tillman, Business Transactions, supra note 294, at 761.  The three commissioners that 
ran the public auction, according to Professor Tillman, were David Stuart, a member of the Vir-
ginia Convention that ratified the Constitution, Daniel Carroll, who was a member of the Federal 
Constitutional Convention, and Thomas Johnson, who was the first Governor of Maryland and 
later became a U.S. Supreme Court Justice.  Id. at 761–62.  
 298.  Tillman, supra note 49, at 188–80 (describing how Washington received a key to the 
Bastille from Lafayette and a portrait from King Louis XVI).  
 299.  Tillman, Citizens United, supra note 294, at 415.  
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my person.”300  Professor Tillman argues that President Washington’s ac-
ceptance of the French gift without asking first for congressional consent 
shows the Framers did not intend for the Foreign Emoluments Clause to 
apply to the President.301   
Tillman takes the position that construing the emoluments Clauses 
broadly to encompass profits or advantages and applying it to the President 
“amounts to a naked assertion by twenty-first century legal academics that 
they understand the Constitution’s binding legal meaning better than those 
who drafted it, ratified it, and put it into effect during the Washington ad-
ministration.”302  The premise of the argument is Washington’s actions as 
the first President should be dispositive of what the Framers intended the 
Emoluments Clauses to mean at the time of the Founding, and by extension, 
what they mean today.  An originalist approach arguing what the Framers 
actually did should be dispositive of what the Emoluments Clauses means 
is limiting for many reasons, including that judges, and lawyers for that 
matter, are (usually) not trained historians, nor should they be expected to 
be.303   
The Supreme Court warned of the dangers of looking exclusively to 
history and tradition to answer constitutional questions.304  Justice Kennedy 
discussed in Obergefell v. Hodges305 how the Founders “did not presume to 
know the extent of freedom in all its dimensions, and so they entrusted to 
future generations a charter.”306  If we were to take Washington’s actions as 
dispositive of what the Emoluments Clauses means, or is intended to mean, 
we would be limiting ourselves to a static understanding of the Constitution 
that even the Framers may not have intended.307 
                                                          
 300.  Id. at 416 (quoting Letter from George Washington to Ambassador Ternant (Dec. 22, 
1791), in 9 THE PAPERS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 306 (Mark A. Mastromarino & Jack D. War-
ren, Jr., eds., 2000)).  
 301.  Id. at 17 (arguing that President Washington would not have perceived himself as being 
an “Officer” in the context of the Foreign Emoluments Clause).  
 302.  Tillman, Business Transaction, supra note 294, at 763.  
 303.  See Daniel A. Farber, The Originalism Debate: A Guide for the Perplexed, 49 OHIO ST. 
L.J. 1085 (1989), reprinted in CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY: ARGUMENTS AND PERSPECTIVES, su-
pra note 261, at 211, 215 (“[The Framers’] shared common culture should be reflected in some 
degree of consensus about the meaning of texts.  Even where this is true, however, discerning that 
consensus may require a deep knowledge of a historical period, which may be beyond the reach of 
anyone but historians specializing in the period.”). 
 304.  See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2602 (2015) (discussing how rights do not 
come only from history and ancient sources).  
 305.  135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).  The Court in Obergefell held that same-sex couples have the 
right to marry under the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.  
Id. at 2604–05.  
 306.  Id. at 2598.  
 307.  See id.  
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3.  An Original Public Meaning Approach 
The original public meaning approach to constitutional interpretation 
centers on what the voters originally understood the provisions to mean, 
versus the actions or thoughts of the Framers.308  Justice Scalia wrote he 
consulted the writings of the delegates to the Constitutional Convention, not 
to glean how the delegates thought, but rather because their writings dis-
played how the text of the Constitution was originally understood.309 This 
approach considers the Constitution was written for the voters to under-
stand.310 
Under an original public meaning perspective, the Maryland Federal 
District Court in District of Columbia v. Trump correctly held that emolu-
ments were understood at the time of the founding to mean any profit, gain 
or advantage.311  The President’s narrower definition of “emoluments” is 
based in part on the early cases, such as, Hoyt v. United States, United 
States v. MacMillan, and McLean v. United States, which defined emolu-
ments as compensation and fees for the services of their office.312  Professor 
Grewal describes an office-related definition of emoluments as the original 
meaning of emoluments, stating that the relevant legal authority provides 
“that emoluments under the Constitution refer to compensation received in 
exchange for services provided as an officer or employee” rather than the 
broader definition of profits, gains, or advantages from foreign govern-
ments.313  Grewal also makes the point that at the time of the Founding, it is 
possible that people believed only ambassadors would travel abroad exten-
sively, so they were the ones especially susceptible to “improper foreign in-
fluences.”314  Grewal argues that determining whether a foreign government 
directly paid a federal officer in exchange for personal services or has indi-
rectly paid a federal officer through payments to a business are factual dif-
ferences that “must be examined closely.”315   
One problem with the office-related definition of emoluments is that it 
would not include a scenario where a federal official received some sort of 
                                                          
 308.  Keith E. Whittington, The New Originalism, 2 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 599 (2004), re-
printed in CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY: ARGUMENTS AND PERSPECTIVES, supra note 261, at 233, 
243, 244 (describing how the original public meaning approach “is focused less on the concrete 
intentions of individual drafters of constitutional text than on the public meaning of the text that 
was adopted”).  
 309.  SCALIA, supra note 261, at 179–80. 
 310.  District of Columbia v. Trump, 315 F. Supp. 3d 875, 889 (D. Md. 2018) (quoting District 
of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 576 (2007)).  
 311.  Id. at 900; see Teachout, supra note 30, at 30; supra note 229.  
 312.  See supra Section I.B. 
 313.  Amandeep S. Grewal, The Foreign Emoluments Clause and the Chief Executive, 102 
MINN. L. REV. 639, 692 (2017).  
 314.  Id. at 646–47. 
 315.  Id. at 692.  
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benefit from a foreign government official even though they did not offi-
cially return a service.  Receiving a benefit in those circumstances would 
not necessarily rise to the same level as a quid pro quo, but it potentially 
could be corrupting, because the official might feel placed in a similar posi-
tion as the ambassador receiving an extravagant gift.316  In support of a 
broader definition of emoluments,317 the Maryland Federal District Court 
explained it is difficult for people to know whether a benefit has the poten-
tial to corrupt or not.318  The court stated, when a President maintains a lux-
ury hotel that generates profits while he is in office—even if those profits 
go in a Trust—it creates the appearance of undue influence, which is 
enough.319  The court stated, “How, indeed, could it ever be proven, in a 
given case, that he had actually been influenced by the payments?  The 
Framers of the Clauses made it simple. Ban the offerings altogether (unless, 
in the foreign context at least, Congress sees fit to approve them).”320  Be-
cause actual influence is so difficult to prove, preventing even the appear-
ance of receiving an undue influence from foreign government officials in 
the context of the Emoluments Clauses and without the consent of Congress 
makes sense.  
The Maryland Federal District Court in District of Columbia v. Trump 
correctly held the reach of the Emoluments Clauses goes beyond quid pro 
quo corruption in the Foreign Emoluments Clause321 because the original 
purpose of the Emoluments Clauses was to protect against both actual cor-
ruption and the appearance of corruption.322  The court found this anticor-
ruption interest covered more than a quid pro quo.323  Based on the original 
public meaning of the Emoluments Clauses, the court held the intent of the 
provision was to prevent corruption and undue foreign influences, and went 
“beyond simple payment for services rendered by a federal official in his 
official capacity, which in effect would merely restate a prohibition against 
                                                          
 316.  See supra notes 64–68. 
 317.  District of Columbia v. Trump, 315 F. Supp. 3d 875, 898 (D. Md. 2018).  
 318.  Id.  
 319.  Id.  
 320.  Id.; see also Teachout, supra note 32, at 380 (describing how the Framers tried to put 
structures and conditions in place to minimize corruption).  
 321.  Trump, 315 F. Supp. 3d at 895 (discussing the practical difficulties of narrowly constru-
ing the Clauses because “any requirement that a quid pro quo for official services has been estab-
lished would be easy to circumvent while at the same time difficult to prove”); McCutcheon v. 
FEC, 572 U.S. 185, 192 (2014) (defining quid pro quo as a Latin phrase capturing the notion of “a 
direct exchange of an official act for money” or “dollars for political favors”); Sills, supra note 32, 
at 63–64 (discussing how classical republican ideals, including concerns that corruption and greed 
could destroy a nation, played an important role in the formation of the country); see supra Sec-
tion II.A. 
 322.  See supra text accompanying notes 287–290.  
 323.  Trump, 315 F. Supp. 3d at 898; see also Zephyr Teachout, Love, Equality, and Corrup-
tion, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 453, 454 (2015).  
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bribery.”324  The text of the Clause lends supports to this reading because it 
includes the modifiers of “any kind whatever,” indicating the purpose of the 
Clause is to prevent a wide breadth of emoluments.325   
The expansive modifier in the Foreign Emoluments Clause is signifi-
cant because in the context of First Amendment jurisprudence, the Supreme 
Court has been hesitant to find an anti-corruption purpose in the Constitu-
tion beyond quid pro quo corruption.  In First Amendment campaign fi-
nance cases, the Court held the government’s anti-corruption interest only 
covered quid pro quo corruption.326  One important distinguishing factor, 
however, is the plain language of the Foreign Emoluments Clause lends it-
self to being broadly construed to encompass influences beyond quid pro 
quo corruption, since the provision expressly prevents officials from accept-
ing gifts and presents, which are arguably less corrupting than a bribe.327  
Under an original public meaning approach, the court interpreted the Emol-
uments Clauses as anti-corruption provisions whose original meaning goes 
beyond payments for services rendered.328 
4.  A Purposive Approach 
The court in District of Columbia v. Trump also took a purposive ap-
proach to interpretation, giving substantial weight to executive branch prec-
edent and practice over the decades through the OLC opinions.329  A pur-
posive approach treats historical practice “as an important interpretive 
factor even when the nature or longevity of that practice is subject to dis-
pute, and even when the practice began after the [F]ounding [E]ra.”330  
Blumenthal v. Trump took a purposive approach in describing how previous 
presidents acted under the assumption that they had to follow the Foreign 
Emoluments Clause.331  For example, when the Republic of Colombia pre-
sented President Andrew Jackson with a gold medal, Jackson placed it “at 
                                                          
 324.  Trump, 315 F. Supp. 3d at 900.  
 325.  Id. at 887–88.  
 326.  Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 357 (2010) (holding that limits on campaign ad-
vertising expenditures “have a chilling effect” on speech “extending beyond the Government’s 
interest in preventing quid pro quo corruption”); McCutcheon, 572 U.S. at 209 (“The line between 
quid pro quo corruption and general influence may seem vague at times, but the distinction must 
be respected in order to safeguard basic First Amendment rights.”).  
 327.  See supra notes 322–325 and accompanying text.  
 328.  See supra note 327 and accompanying text.  
 329.  Trump, 315 F. Supp. 3d at 900; see supra Section I.C.   
 330.  NLRB. v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2560 (2014).  In NLRB. v. Noel Canning, Jus-
tice Breyer, writing for the majority, “put significant weight upon historical practice” since the 
time of the Founding in interpreting the Recess Appointments Clause of the Constitution.  Id. at 
2559.   
 331.  Blumenthal v. Trump, 335 F. Supp. 3d 45, 53 (D.D.C. 2018). 
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the disposal of Congress.”332  When the King of Siam gave President Abra-
ham Lincoln gifts, Lincoln notified Congress, and they “deposited [the 
gifts] in the collection of curiosities at the Department of Interior.”333  Pres-
idents have consistently turned to the OLC for legal advice about all mat-
ters, including whether they could constitutionally accept gifts from foreign 
government officials.334  President John F. Kennedy asked the OLC wheth-
er it would be constitutional to accept an “honorary Irish citizenship.”335  
The OLC determined under the “spirit of the provision,” President Kennedy 
should get the consent of Congress in order to accept the honorary title.336  
As discussed in Section I.C., President Barack Obama turned to the OLC to 
provide guidance on whether accepting the Nobel Peace Prize would be ac-
cepting a prohibited emolument.337 
OLC opinions demonstrate that previous administrations operated un-
der the assumption that the Foreign Emoluments Clause applied to the Pres-
ident.338  The OLC under previous administrations, both Republican and 
Democrat, looked to the purpose of the Clauses to decide whether the bene-
fit received from a foreign official had the potential to unduly influence or 
corrupt the recipient,339 and this is the approach the court took in District of 
Columbia v. Trump.340  On one hand, the retirement pension President 
                                                          
 332.  Id. (quoting Brief of Federal Jurisdiction and Constitutional Law Scholars as Amici Curi-
ae in Support of Plaintiffs at 24, Blumenthal, 335 F. Supp. 3d 45 (No. 17-1154 (EGS))).  
 333.  Id. (quoting Brief of Federal Jurisdiction and Constitutional Law Scholars, supra note 
332, at 25).  
 334.  Id. at 53–54; see supra Section I.C. 
 335.  See Blumenthal, 335 F. Supp. 3d at 54 (citing Proposal that the President Accept Honor-
ary Irish Citizenship, 1 Op. O.L.C. Supp. 278, 279 (1963)).  
 336.  Proposal that the President Accept Honorary Irish Citizenship, 1 Op. O.L.C. Supp. 278, 
279, 281 (1963).  
 337.  Id.; see Section I.C.  
 338.  See Amicus Brief of Former Government Ethics Officials Don Fox, et al. at 12, District 
of Columbia v. Trump, 315 F. Supp. 3d 725 (D. Md. 2018) (No. 18-2488) (recognizing that execu-
tive branch precedent considers an official’s business interests with a foreign government to be an 
emolument when it “plausibly create[s] a conduit for improper payments and influence”); supra 
Section I.C. 
 339.  See Applicability of the Emoluments Clause and the Foreign Gifts and Decorations Act 
to the President’s Receipt of the Nobel Peace Prize, 33 Op. O.L.C. 1, 4 (2009) (finding that even 
though the Nobel Peace Prize was an emolument, the President would not run afoul of the Foreign 
Emoluments Clause by accepting it because the Nobel Committee was not a foreign government); 
Applicability of the Emoluments Clause to Non-Government Members of ACUS, 17 Op. O.L.C. 
114, 1119 (1993) (discussing whether a member of ACUS receiving income from a partnership 
where a foreign government could be providing some of the money violated the Foreign Emolu-
ments Clause); Application of the Emoluments Clause of the Constitution and the Foreign Gifts 
and Decorations Act, 6 Op. O.L.C. 156, 158 (1982) (discussing whether the source of payment to 
an NRC employee is from a foreign State or an intermediary); President Reagan’s Ability to Re-
ceive Ret. Benefits from the State of Cal., 5 Op. O.L.C. 187, 192 (1981) (discussing whether state 
retirement benefits subjected President Reagan to undue influence under the Domestic Emolu-
ments Clause). 
 340.  District of Columbia v. Trump, 315 F. Supp. 3d 875, 900 (D. Md. 2018).  
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Reagan received as Governor of California was fully vested before Reagan 
became President, so the OLC determined the benefit lacked the potential to 
influence his decision-making.341  On the other hand, the OLC found money 
a partner received from a partnership, where the partnership was a mere 
“conduit” for a foreign government, had the potential to influence the mem-
ber and would constitute an emolument because some portion of the mem-
ber’s income could be attributed to a foreign government.342  The OLC 
opinions, while not binding precedent, are useful guidance,343 and courts in 
the emoluments litigation correctly gave them weight in their analysis of the 
Emoluments Clauses.344 
B.  A Living Approach to Interpreting the Emoluments Clauses 
In District of Columbia v. Trump, both the DOJ representing President 
Trump and Washington, D.C. and Maryland interpreted the Constitution 
with an original public meaning and purposive analysis approach.345  In 
fact, the court expressly pointed out that neither side “lock[ed] horns” over 
constitutional interpretation at all.346  One road not yet taken by anyone in 
the emoluments litigation is a living constitution approach.  Is it possible to 
derive meaning in the twenty-first century from a word that is rarely, if ev-
er, used today, without looking exclusively to the past?347  Justice Brennan 
described the logic of the living constitution approach: 
 Current Justices read the Constitution in the only way we can: 
as twentieth-century Americans. . . .  [T]he ultimate question 
must be: What do the words of the text mean in our time?  For the 
genius of the Constitution rests not in any static meaning it might 
have had in a world that is dead and gone, but in the adaptability 
of its great principles to cope with current problems and current 
needs.348 
Perhaps the most famous proponent of the living constitution approach 
was Chief Justice John Marshall who wrote in McCulloch v. Maryland,349 
                                                          
 341.  See supra text accompanying notes 133–136. 
 342.  Applicability of the Emoluments Clause to Non-Government Members of ACUS, 17 Op. 
O.L.C. 114, 119 (1993).  
 343.  See NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2560 (2014).   
 344.  But see Grewal, supra note 49, at 170–78 (arguing courts should take a textual approach 
and not a purposive one because a textual approach is more consistent with legal authorities).  
 345.  Trump, 315 F. Supp. 3d at 881.  
 346.  Id.   
 347.  Peter Overby, Federal Lawsuit Against President Trump’s Business Interests Allowed to 
Proceed, NPR (July 25, 2018), https://www.npr.org/2018/07/25/632300960/federal-lawsuit-
against-president-trumps-business-interests-allowed-to-proceed.  
 348.  Farber, supra note 303, at 222 (quoting William J. Brennan, Jr., The Constitution of the 
United States: Contemporary Ratification, 27 S. TEX. L.J. 433, 438 (1986)).  
 349.  17 U.S. 316 (1819).  
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“This provision is made in a constitution intended to endure for ages to 
come, and, consequently, to be adapted to the various crises of human af-
fairs.”350  Under a living approach, the Emoluments Clauses should not be 
viewed as dusty provisions frozen in time during the Founding Era and not 
intended to be applied to modern day circumstances.  For Justice Marshall, 
the Constitution was fundamental and permanent.351  Similarly, in Brown v. 
Board of Education,352 Chief Justice Warren famously rejected taking a 
strictly historical view to interpreting the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment: 
 In approaching this problem, we cannot turn back the clock 
back to 1868 when the Amendment was adopted, or even to 1896 
when Plessy v. Ferguson was written.  We must consider public 
education in the light of its full development and its present place 
in American life throughout the Nation.353 
Using a living approach, the Brown Court interpreted the Fourteenth 
Amendment through the modern lens of the importance of education in 
1954, rather than what people at the time of the Founding would have 
thought of education.354  Similarly, in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. 
Sawyer (Steel Seizure),355 Justice Jackson wrote in his concurring opinion 
that understanding what the Framers intended had they known modern con-
ditions “must be divined from materials almost as enigmatic as the dreams 
Joseph was called upon to interpret for Pharaoh.”356 
The value of the living constitution approach is that it allows judges to 
flexibly apply the meaning of the Emoluments Clauses to modern circum-
stances.  As Professor Grewal points out, “[The Constitution] must be ap-
plied to facts not envisioned by the Framers or the ratifying states.”357  A 
living approach may seem at odds with an originalist approach, but it need 
not be.  According to Professor Kermit Roosevelt, the appropriate living 
“inquiry” decides whether the relevant constitutional provision’s words and 
                                                          
 350.  Id. at 415.  Professor Eugene W. Hickok, Jr. references this quotation from McCulloch v. 
Maryland in his scholarship.  Eugene W. Hickock, Jr., The Birth of the “Living” Constitution, 14 
COLONIAL LAW. 6, 6 (1985).  
 351.  Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. 304, 326 (1816) (describing how the Constitution was 
intended to last: “The instrument was not intended to provide merely for the exigencies of a few 
years, but was to endure through a long lapse of ages, the events of which were locked up in the 
inscrutable purposes of Providence”); see Hickok, Jr., supra note 350, at 6, 7 (describing how the 
Framers recognized a need to allow for change in society, but also saw a need to adhere to perma-
nent principles provided in a written Constitution). 
 352.  347 U.S. 483 (1954).  
 353.  Id. at 492–93.  
 354.  Id.  
 355.  343 U.S. 579, 634 (1952). 
 356.  Id. at 634 (Jackson, J., concurring).  
 357.  Grewal, supra note 313, at 692.  
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purpose are “better served by a static or flexible range of applications.”358  
For example, based on the way provisions like the Equal Protection Clause 
and the Fourth Amendment were written, the Founders arguably intended 
for them to be flexibly applied, while their meanings stayed constant.359  
The question, then, is whether the Emoluments Clauses’ purpose is better 
served by a “fixed or flexible range of applications.”360  The courts do not 
disagree that the Clauses’ purpose was to prevent corruption.361  Since the 
words of the Emoluments Clauses do not limit its application to particular 
issues, and use the expansive modifiers of “any kind whatever,”362 it makes 
sense to assume the Framers intended the Clauses to have a flexible appli-
cation to prevent corruption, rather than a fixed one.363 
A flexible application of the Emoluments Clauses would recognize, 
since Watergate, Presidents have taken steps on their own to avoid even the 
appearance of impropriety, by consulting the OLC for advisory opinions 
about whether something is an emolument,364 or divesting their assets.365  
Since the 1970s, every President placed their assets in a trust administered 
by an independent trustee.366  The main conflicts of interest statute for gov-
ernment officials, the Ethics in Government Act of 1978,367 which was en-
acted in the wake of Watergate,368 does not require government officials to 
shed assets; instead, it requires them to recuse themselves from working on 
policies that conflict with those holdings.369 
The Ethics in Government Act of 1978 did not extend a recusal re-
quirement to the President because of separation of powers concerns.370  
Despite being formally excluded from coverage under the law, scholar 
                                                          
 358.  Kermit Roosevelt, Originalism and the Living Constitution: Reconciliation, 1 ADVANCE 
57, 60 (2007).  
 359.  Id. at 61.  
 360.  Id. at 62.  
 361.  See supra note 32 and accompanying text; supra Section I.A. 
 362.  See supra text accompanying note 275. 
 363.  See Roosevelt, supra note 358, at 62; see also Brief of Former National Security Official 
as Amicus Curiae at 9, 21, In re Trump, No. 18-2486 (4th Cir. 2019, Feb. 13, 2019) (describing 
how the Framers wrote a Foreign Emoluments Clause that is sweeping in scope, and only a read-
ing of the Clause that encompasses private dealings with foreign governments can adequately pro-
tect U.S. national security and foreign policy interests in the modern era).  
 364.  See supra Section I.C. 
 365.  DANIEL I. WEINER, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., STRENGTHENING PRESIDENTIAL ETHICS 
LAWS 1 (2017), 
https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/publications/Strengthening%20Presidential%20
Ethics%20Law.%20Daniel%20Weiner.pdf. 
 366.  Id.  
 367.  Pub. L. No. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1824 (1978).  
 368.  Daphna Renan, Presidential Norms and Article II, 131 HARV. L. REV. 2187, 2219 (2018). 
 369.  WEINER, supra note 365, at 1.  
 370.  Renan, supra note 368, at 2219 (discussing how “the Ethics in Government Act did not 
extend the statutory requirements . . . to the President, and subsequent legislation would expressly 
exclude the President and Vice President from . . . coverage”).  
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Daphne Renan explains, “[T]he conflict-of-interest norm, under which Pres-
idents conduct themselves as if bound by the formal prohibitions, became 
further institutionalized and regularized as a result of the Ethics in Govern-
ment Act’s passage.”371  The Office of Government Ethics (“OGE”) has ad-
vised officials over the years to divest their assets, and it has since become 
routine to do so, according to Walter Shaub, the former head of the OGE.372  
While the President is subject to some disclosure rules under the Federal 
Ethics in Government Act, “loopholes in those rules make it comparatively 
easy to avoid full disclosure of assets, sources of income, and debts that 
could impact official decision-making.”373   
The Trump Administration expressed ambivalence about the divest-
ment norm.  For example, John Bolton, current National Security Advisor, 
told the Hamilton Society it is “harder to get things done” in part because of 
the “excessive nature of the so-called ethics checks,” which he believes is 
discouraging people from taking government jobs.374  President Trump is 
unique because of his wide variety of business interests375 that make it more 
difficult for him to divest.  An ethics advisor to The Donald J. Trump Rev-
ocable Trust, Bobby R. Burchfield, stated, “liquidation or divestiture would 
not make sense” in the President’s case because his “holdings are extensive 
and diversified throughout the world.”376  According to Burchfield, divest-
ing would “be a fire sale with a potentially draconian loss of value.”377  In 
arguing the Trust is not that unusual, Burchfield stated President Jimmy 
Carter put his peanut farm holdings in a trust, with his lawyer as trustee.378  
The difference, however, is that President Trump’s sons manage his Trust 
and inform him periodically about how it is doing.379  It is difficult to argue 
that the Trust is truly a blind trust when Trump’s own family members are 
managing it day to day rather than an independent trustee.380  The lack of a 
buffer between the President’s sons running the Trust and the President 
                                                          
 371.  Id.  
 372.  Ryan Lizza, How Trump Broke the Office of Government Ethics, NEW YORKER (July 14, 
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himself indicates a greater potential for Trump, through the Trust, to receive 
a profit, gain, or advantage from the Trump Hotel’s alleged catering to for-
eign government officials.381  
Ultimately, the Emoluments Clause question is not whether divesting 
is easy or difficult.  Consistent with the OLC interpretations from Democrat 
and Republican administrations, the question should be whether profits, 
benefits or advantages received from foreign government entities is an un-
due influence, or has the appearance of being an undue influence, necessi-
tating the consent of Congress.382  Under a living approach, the Emolu-
ments Clauses would take into account the Clauses’ purposes to prevent 
corruption and undue influence383 and apply them to the modern day, where 
for many decades, Presidents have divested to avoid even the appearance of 
conflicts of interest.384 
C.  A Moral Reading of the Foreign Emoluments Clause 
This Section considers how a moral reading of the Clauses allows 
courts to consider the abstract, moral dimension of the Clauses’ purpose.  
Ronald Dworkin, the leading constitutional theorist for a moral reading of 
the Constitution, explains many of the Clauses in the Constitution “are 
drafted in exceedingly abstract moral language.”385  The question of inter-
pretation, or “translation” is to try and find language of our own that best 
captures the Framers’ intent.386 
History helps us understand if there is a moral principle embedded in 
the constitutional provision, or if the provision is a straightforward one, like 
the Third Amendment,387 which insists government may not quarter sol-
diers in citizens’ house in peacetime.388  According to Dworkin, one could 
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read into the Third Amendment and glean a principle from it, but it would 
not make a lot of sense since it is clear what the plain language of the Third 
Amendment means regarding soldiers in citizens’ houses during peace-
time.389  The same reasoning leads to a different result for the Equal Protec-
tion Clause, however, because the phrase “equal protection of the laws” 
means something more—it is a deep statement that describes a general 
principle of equality under the law.390  Similarly, history shows the Framers 
were concerned about corruption and undue foreign influence, and their 
concern was one of the reasons the Emoluments Clauses were enacted.391  
The word “emoluments” is also relatively ambiguous since it had two 
meanings at the time of the Founding, and the word was not defined in the 
Constitution.392 
A moral reasoning approach is not unfettered to the text or history.  
Two restraints limit the scope of a moral reasoning approach.393  First, what 
the Framers’ intended matters.394  Second, constitutional interpretation “is 
disciplined under the moral reading by the requirement of constitutional in-
tegrity. . . .  Judges may not read their own convictions into the Constitu-
tion.”395  According to Dworkin: 
The moral reading asks [judges] to find the best conception of 
constitutional moral principles . . . that fits the broad story of 
America’s historical record.  It does not ask them to follow the 
whisperings of their own consciences or the traditions of their 
own class or sect if these cannot be seen as embedded in that rec-
ord.396 
In other words, applying a moral reading approach, a judge would find 
a conception of an anti-corruption principle that “fits” America’s history.397  
The moral reading approach sees the words of the Constitution as being tied 
to history but also having “abstractions.”398  Scholar Jack M. Balkin de-
scribes how lawyers use history to make legal arguments: “[W]henever 
lawyers use history to show purpose, they are implicitly making an argu-
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ment that the best reading of a text is one that fulfills the purposes of the 
statute or constitutional provision, and this claim, in turn, presupposes a 
theory of how laws should be applied.”399  In other words, “the acceptable 
forms of legal argument” are justified by “the moral and political ideas that 
underwrite them.”400  Critics of this approach say it allows judges to have 
too much unfettered say over the law.401  But really the process of unpack-
ing an “anti-corruption principle” in the Clauses is not unmoored to the text 
and purpose of the Constitution, even as originalists understand it.402  
The notion of corruption has an independent, moral component to it.403  
Corruption has two definitions in Black’s Law Dictionary: “an impairment 
of integrity, virtue, or moral principle, esp. the impairment of a public offi-
cial’s duties by bribery” and “[a] fiduciary’s or official’s use of a station or 
office to procure some benefit either personally or for someone else.”404  
Professor Teachout argues that corruption goes even further and has “a 
moral sense” with the “deep core of corruption involv[ing] personal, moral 
failure.”405  Ms. Sills argued the Framers intended for the Emoluments 
Clauses “to guard against corruption in order to preserve and protect our 
young Republic and its institutions from ruin.”406  In The Anti-Corruption 
Principle, Professor Teachout makes the point that “an anti-corruption prin-
ciple” is embedded within the Constitution,407 however, not all scholars as-
cribe to his view.408   
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A key to a charge of corruption, according to Professor Teachout, is 
intent and motive.409  Under a moral reading approach, however, Professor 
Teachout’s take on the Clauses’ purpose goes too far.  The plain language 
of the Foreign Emoluments Clause does not have an intent element.  The 
Framers did not probe the intent of Benjamin Franklin when he accepted 
the gold snuff box from the King of France.410  Instead, as the court in Dis-
trict of Columbia v. Trump correctly recognized, emoluments were 
“ban[ned] . . . all together” without the consent of Congress because they 
have the potential to corrupt and unduly influence the recipient.411  In other 
words, gifts and emoluments were banned because they simply might look 
bad, not because of who was giving or receiving the gift. 
The Framers understood people are not perfect, and the checks and 
balances built into our system of government through the Constitution rep-
resents the Framers’ brilliance in building a foundation that could cope with 
the “moral failings of normal humans, instead of one that could only be 
managed by angels.”412  Accepting a gift or an emolument is likely to influ-
ence the person on the receiving end.413  Rather than examining the intent 
of the person giving the emolument, or the effect accepting an emolument 
from a foreign governmental entity has on an official, the correct inquiry, in 
accordance with the principle behind the Emoluments Clauses, is whether 
receiving the emolument from the foreign governmental entity has the po-
tential to corrupt.414  In that case, the official should ask Congress for per-
mission to accept the emolument.415  A moral reading approach respects the 
history and context of the Clauses’ inclusion in the Constitution416 and rec-
ognizes a moral dimension to prevent corruption.  The Clauses should be 
construed broadly in asking whether receiving an emolument from a foreign 
entity without the consent of Congress violates the moral spirit of the 
Clause.  
III.  CONCLUSION 
Recent emoluments litigation presents interesting questions of consti-
tutional interpretation, as federal courts are faced with the task of interpret-
ing two provisions that have been dormant since the Founding Era.  This 
                                                          
hibition of corruption); Tillman, supra note 407, at 404 (arguing “the Framers were not ‘obsessed’ 
with corruption” and the scope of the anti-corruption principle does not reach elected officials). 
 409.  Teachout, supra note 323, at 454 (describing how “corruption requires talking about 
questions of motive, intent, feeling, and passion”).  
 410.  See supra note 67–70.  
 411.  District of Columbia v. Trump, 315 F. Supp. 3d 875, 898 (D. Md. 2018). 
 412.  Teachout, supra note 32, at 379, 380.  
 413.  See supra text accompanying note 68–69.  
 414.  Trump, 315 F. Supp. 3d at 898.  
 415.  See supra notes 230, 290.  
 416.  See supra Section I.A.  
 2019] INTERPRETING EMOLUMENTS TODAY 1041 
Comment argues the United States District Court for the District of Mary-
land correctly interpreted the word emoluments in the Emoluments Clauses 
as any profit, gain, or advantage based on the plain language of the Clauses 
and an originalist417 approach to interpretation.418  Moreover, the United 
States District Court for the Southern District of New York, the Maryland 
Federal District Court, and the United States District Court for the District 
of Columbia faced with the Emoluments Clauses litigation correctly looked 
to an anti-corruption purpose motivating the provisions.419  This Comment 
analyzes three methods of constitutional interpretation—originalism, living 
constitution, and a moral reading approach—and puts forth the idea courts 
could find an anti-corruption purpose motivating the Emoluments Clauses 
using all three approaches.420  Even for provisions that have lain dormant 
for centuries, a living constitution approach could help inform an under-
standing, not only about what the Emoluments Clauses meant at the time of 
the founding, but what they mean today.421  Moreover, a moral reading of 
the Emoluments Clauses could account for the Clauses’ anti-corruption 
purpose, and consider whether receiving an emolument “violate[s] the spir-
it” of that purpose.422 
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